- What the Arbitrator Ruled in Bargaining 2012, and Why
- Bargaining: Preparation for Next Round Begins
- Bargaining Begins for 2014-2016
- Bargaining Themes: Three Big Issues Emerge
- The University's Destructive Budget Model
- An External Analysis of the University's Budget Model
- Our Pension Proposals
- UBC Proposes 0% for 2014/2015. The Association Declines
- A Most Peculiar Proposal
- Bargaining Ends with Some Agreements
- Educational Leadership Stream
- Maternity, Parental or Adoptive Leave and Tenure Clock Extension
- Procedures for Appointment, Reappointment, Tenure and Promotion
- Equity and the Evaluation of Scholarship
- Transparency and the University
- Titles and Ranks, Appendix A and Other Issues
- President’s Right to Consult re: Tenure and Promotion
- Article 17: Preservation of Past Rights and Practices
- Progress Through the Ranks (PTR)
- UPDATE: University Proposes to Implement PTR Increases
- General Wage Increase (GWI) Proposal Explained
- Benefit Cuts for Members Past Age 71
- Sessionals: Appointments and Salaries
- Lecturer Appointments and Reappointments
- Why Workload Matters
- Promotion and Tenure Procedures
- Tuition Fee Waiver Proposals
- Professional Development Funds
- Vision Care
- Tenured Assistant Professors
- Part-time Sessional Benefit and Pension Issues
- History Behind Annual “Lump-sum Payment,” Part I
- History Behind Annual “Lump-sum Payment,” Part II
- What Happens Now?
- Changes in Composition of the Bargaining Unit, 2006-2015
- A Reasonable Balance
- Arbitration Update
- Arbitration Rescheduled
- Interpreting the Recent Interest Arbitration Award
- Decoding University Budget Matters
Decoding University Budget Matters
Posted on Tuesday, May 24, 2016 at 2:00 p.m.
categories: UBC Budget, Ability to Pay, General Wage Increase, Arbitration
This is the thirtieth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute, as well as the arbitration process in general.
As members who have had the time annually to peruse the University’s audited financial statements will already know, UBC had another very profitable year in Fiscal 2015, with a budgetary surplus of $49 million, of which $31 million was the surplus on operations.
The future similarly looks bright according to the budget recently passed by the Board of Governors. From it we learn that the Board expects international undergraduate tuition revenue to grow by 43% between 2015 and 2017. The provincial government operating grant is expected to increase in 2016/2017 for the first time in many years and the government is also expected to expand the funding for capital maintenance.
The University’s strong financial position over the past several years has allowed the Board to make significant capital expenditures annually from its operating revenue. Over recent years UBC has diverted a large percentage of operating funds to capital. In 2015 alone, the University spent approximately 13% of unrestricted revenues on capital expenditures, the highest of any university in BC.
The University has also not been averse to creating massive administrative bloat in its complement of management and professional staff. According to a report in the Globe and Mail, between 2009/10 and 2014/15 the faculty complement increased by 0.9% while management and professional staff increased by 25%. Meanwhile, clerical and support staff actually suffered cuts. Additionally the Globe notes that “UBC has a 2:1 staff-to-faculty ratio, while (the University of) Toronto has a 1:2 ratio”.
This report in the Globe would have been no surprise to members who read the report by Janet and Cameron Morrill of the University of Manitoba’s Asper School of Business that was commissioned by the Faculty Association several years ago. Their report highlighted both the diversion of operating surpluses to capital and also the administrative bloat. Members who did not read this excellent report at that time, and who are interested in matters budgetary, would do well to read it now.
Based on the most recent budget passed by the Board of Governors, the rosy financial forecast has allowed the Board to allocate significant funds both to the capital program, and to a much lesser extent, the UBC Excellence Fund (which will be used, among other purposes, to hire new faculty in a number of departments).
Members should be aware that the University budget is not audited and is not a financial statement in any way. It is more of a statement of priorities. Unfortunately, it is clear from the budget documents that, Excellence Fund aside, funding academic departments is not a priority. The Board continues to make no provision to provide Faculties with the funds to pay merit, PSA, retention, career progress increments, and general wages increases. This is a long standing problem with the budgeting process at this university. All of the institution’s profits are retained by the central administration, so that money can be invested in capital projects and strategic initiatives while no provision is made to adequately fund Faculties and departments.
As a consequence of the University’s central administration’s priorities, members can expect the usual biennial canard from senior management that salary increases from the recent arbitration were “unanticipated” and thus departments must find efficiencies to fund the increases internally. This of course is entirely false. First, the salary increases were not unanticipated. The award of the Arbitration Board was hardly outside the plausible range. The University of Toronto recently achieved raises of 1.9% and 1.9% for 2014/15 and 2015/16. The University of Northern British Columbia was awarded a settlement that works out to more than 10% over five years, and the University of Victoria recently reached an agreement that works out to 1.44% in 2014/15 and approximately 2.94% in 2015/16. Our settlement of 2% and 2% was hardly extraordinary. We were pleased with it, given the University’s disrespectful offer of 0% and 1%, but it was hardly unexpected.
Secondly, the decision by the Board to squeeze the Faculties and departments, and keep the profits of the University at the centre to fund various investments is just that, a decision. The University certainly has the ability to pay the modest salary settlements that the arbitration panel deemed necessary to keep pace with inflation, and it certainly has the ability to pay more than the arbitration award. The panel explained its findings in paragraphs 75-78 of the award , noting “We conclude the award is within the University’s ability to pay pursuant to Article 11.02(e).”
UBC could easily afford to pay faculty salaries that are comparable to salaries at the University of Toronto. Central administration just doesn’t want to. This is not a financial problem, it is a Board of Governors problem, aided and abetted by the central administration.
This problem is not new, nor does it seem to be going away. For historical perspective we recommend members read, or re-read, our blog post on this very issue of two years ago.
Next up on the blog: TBA
Interpreting the Recent Interest Arbitration Award
Posted on Wednesday, April 6, 2016 at 3:00 p.m.
categories: Arbitration, General Wage Increase, Retention, Annual Lump Sum
This is the twenty-ninth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute, as well as the arbitration process in general.
The Faculty Association and the University were in interest arbitration in the middle of February, because the parties had not been able to reach agreement on an appropriate salary increase for the period 2014-2016. The Association relied on Article 11.02e of the Collective Agreement to argue that a general wage increase (GWI) of 3% and 3% was in order. The University relied on the provincial government’s Public Sector Employer Council (PSEC) mandate to make its arguments for its position of a GWI of 0% and 0.9%.
We are very pleased to report that the arbitration panel was sympathetic with the Association’s position on a salary increase. As in the previous arbitration, the panel once again found that the PSEC mandate had no bearing on determining an appropriate GWI. Specifically at paragraph 5, the Award states:
 Article 11.02(e) is an “adjudicative” model of interest arbitration. It exhaustively specifies the criteria upon which the award is based. Those criteria do not include the general public sector bargaining mandate set by the Public Sector Employers Counsel (“PSEC”).
The panel concluded that the University had the ability to pay more than its offer, and used the criteria of Article 11.02e of the Collective Agreement to determine that the appropriate salary increase was 2% for 2014-2015 and 2% for 2015-2016. Thus the panel awarded increases of 2% and 1.1% greater than the University’s offer.
The University requested a retention fund be included as part of the GWI, effectively suggesting that faculty members should pay for retention by receiving less than the deserved GWI. The panel awarded retention, but added that on top of the 2% and 2%, rightly seeing that retention should be a cost to the University. The Association argued vigorously at arbitration that it is the employer’s responsibility to pay for retention, not the employees’ responsibility.
The University also insisted at arbitration that the 1% lump sum paid each year at the end of June was a 1% increase in salary, even though it had lost this argument at the previous arbitration. The panel again dismissed the University’s argument, noting that the 1% lump sum payment is not an annual increase to members’ salaries (paragraphs 59-61 of the Award). The simple conclusion of the panel regarding the University’s argument is as follows:
 We are unpersuaded by the University’s argument. The 1% annual lump sum is part of existing compensation and, while the dollar amount of the 1% may change from year to year, it does not take the place of a general wage increase.… The principled distinction to be made is not between a lump sum and a percentage, but between existing compensation and an increase to existing compensation. The 1% annual lump sum is part of existing compensation. It is therefore taken into account as existing compensation. It is not an increase, and does not take the place of an increase under Article 11.02(e).
We were surprised that the University took the position that it did, and we trust that the arbitration panel’s discussion of this will finally put that matter to rest.
The panel awarded no language to either party, which was disappointing but it is not unusual for an interest arbitration panel not to award language. The language we seek is very important to the membership and we will continue to try to achieve these changes in bargaining or, failing that, future arbitrations.
The panel also awarded no benefits improvements. We have the lowest Professional Development reimbursement limits in BC and almost the lowest in Canada. Our vision care provisions are not even at the level enjoyed by other employees at UBC. And the current provision that cuts off the tuition waiver benefit for dependents of members who die while employed can only be described as cruel. The University fought hard at arbitration not to improve any of these benefits and unfortunately in this matter, in this award, it prevailed.
Under the award, the Collective Agreement will expire June 30, 2016. Thus the parties will be returning to the bargaining table at a time to be determined. We hope, as always, for a bargained settlement. In the past three rounds the University has made no attempt to bargain salaries, instead proposing general wage increases below inflation, below settlements at our comparator universities, and well below its ability to pay, which are the criteria under Article 11.02e of the Collective Agreement. UBC consistently takes the position that it will not deviate from a government bargaining mandate that it knows full well will drive the parties to arbitration, where the mandate itself cannot be considered. We hope the University will take a more sensible view about the PSEC mandate in the upcoming round of bargaining.
Next up on the blog: Decoding University Budget Matters
Posted on Monday, October 26, 2015 at 12:00 p.m.
This is the twenty-eighth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute, as well as the arbitration process in general.
Arbitration dates had originally been set for October 20-22. No fewer than 8 written submissions (four each side) have now been exchanged between the parties. Unfortunately in the process of this exchange of submissions, evidentiary issues arose that could not be resolved in time to meet the originally scheduled dates, and the arbitration has had to be rescheduled. The new dates are February 16-18, 2016.
Meanwhile, we invite you to read the following:
- Faculty Association submission (August 31)
- Faculty Association reply submission (October 9).
- The University's submission
- The University's reply submission
Next up on the blog: Interpreting the Recent Interest Arbitration Award
Posted on Wednesday, July 22, 2015 at 12:00 p.m.
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the twenty-seventh in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute, as well as the arbitration process in general.
On the first day of bargaining the Faculty Association and the University agreed that, should there be outstanding issues after collective bargaining finished, they would meet to exchange the proposals they would be taking to arbitration before writing their submissions for the Arbitration Board. This was intended to make it easier for each side to prepare its written submissions, the first of which is due August 31. We were expecting to do an exchange with the University on Tuesday, July 21 of the Parties’ final proposals (i.e., the ones that the Parties are taking to arbitration), but there remains some disagreement about what the Parties can put forward to the arbitrator. We’ll update you when the exchange takes place.
Next up on the blog: Arbitration Rescheduled
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A Reasonable Balance
Posted on Thursday, July 16, 2015 at 9:00 a.m.
categories: Arbitration, Ability to Pay
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the twenty-sixth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute, as well as the arbitration process in general.
In the forthcoming arbitration a great deal of ink will be devoted in the Parties’ briefs to the meaning of “reasonable balance” as each party lays out its arguments for the salary increases it proposes. There is a reason for this. Normally in an interest arbitration an Arbitration Board would take into account the employer’s “ability to pay” an award. However with respect to the public sector this concept has proven tricky. As Arbitrator Getz put it in the 1989 UBCFA vs UBC award:
“Arbitrators in interest disputes such as this have found ‘ability to pay’ a troublesome concept. They have devoted a great many words to analyzing and expounding it, and drawing distinctions between its application in the context of employers, such as the University, funded out of public revenues and those who are not so funded.”1
In fact interest arbitrators have largely refused to consider “ability to pay” in the public sector on the grounds that to allow government underfunding to justify the payment of substandard wages is to ask public sector employees to subsidize the rest of the community. As Arbitrator Shime famously put it: “Public sector employees should not be required to subsidize the community by accepting substandard wages and working conditions.”2
However, for better or worse, “ability to pay” in the usual sense does not apply in an arbitration between UBC and UBCFA. This is because our Collective Agreement requires that the Arbitrator give first consideration to “ability to pay” but then defines that ability in terms of the need to preserve a reasonable balance between Faculty Association salaries and other expenditures from the University’s general purpose operating funds (GPOF). In accordance with this criterion, the University is deemed to have the “ability to pay” the cost of an award if, in doing so, it preserves a reasonable balance between the salary of bargaining unit members and other expenditures from the GPOF.
On the face of it, this looks like a criterion easily met. The Association will be proposing a two-year Agreement with a modest 3% general wage increase each year, plus a handful of other low cost items. The University will be proposing a general wage increase of 0% in the first year and 0.9% in the second year of a new Collective Agreement, plus a couple of other low cost items. Really, it’s pretty hard to imagine any award between the Parties’ positions that will perturb a reasonable balance. Nonetheless a lot of effort, on both sides, will go into the “reasonable balance” analysis. This is not work that the bargaining committee will undertake. We’re not accountants and, in any case, we are hardly unbiased or independent. Our legal counsel has contracted with the accounting firm PwC to provide the analysis.
One of the peculiarities of the 2012 arbitration is that the university took the position that it did not have the ability to pay one cent more than their offer of 1.95% and 1.9%, plus minor other cost items. On the face of it this seems unlikely. One of the proposals they claimed not to have the ability to pay was our proposal to allow enrolled children of faculty members to maintain their tuition waiver in the event of the death of the faculty member, a proposal the University costed at $704/year. For the entire bargaining unit. That left them to argue at arbitration that an additional $704 per year in costs would disrupt the reasonable balance because the proposed salary offer of the University had taken it to “the limit of its ability to pay.” How was this possible? They appear to have come by this conclusion with two arguments that can best be described as strained.
First, in the University’s original brief (paragraph 59) it states that:
“Prior arbitration boards have held that a ‘reasonable balance’ is the balance derived from the previous negotiated collective agreement. In other words, the product of the parties' own negotiated agreement is the best evidence of the reasonable balance.”
This suggests that the arbitrator should view the actual ratio of salaries to expenses (as defined in the Agreement) in the previous year as the rigid and fixed definition of “reasonable balance.” Obviously if you have a rigid definition of “reasonable balance” any cost over that, no matter how small, would be unreasonable.
However the University’s statement in paragraph 59 is not quite accurate. Prior arbitration boards did not hold that a “reasonable balance” is the balance derived from the previous negotiated Collective Agreement. Only the 1989 Getz award, mentioned above, held that a “reasonable ratio” should be so defined. None of the subsequent arbitration boards did so.
The University seems to have overlooked that subsequent to the 1989 award, the language in the Agreement changed from “reasonable ratio” to “reasonable balance,” specifically to allow more flexibility in the definition, and there are now three arbitration awards (1994, 1997, and 2013) that have relied on reasonable balance. In the most recent arbitration (2013) Arbitrator Taylor ruled that the most relevant comparison was to consider the ratios every year from 2006 to 2012. Those ratios show a slight secular increase, with significant variation from year to year. In this the Arbitrator appears to agree with the view of the Association that a reasonable balance is consistent with a range of ratios, not a reliance on just the previous year’s ratio.
The University’s second point occurs in paragraphs 36 and 37 where they state:
“In other words, where the University can show that its allocation of funds, from its general purpose operating funds, preserves a reasonable balance of expenditures, then it has no ability to pay more, as doing so would force a re-allocation of expenditures. Where the Faculty Association can show that the funds allocated to faculty salaries do not preserve a reasonable balance, then the University has the ability to pay more. Where the converse is the case and a reasonable balance is preserved, then by definition there is no ability to pay more as the reasonable balance would be altered in doing so.”
This is an interesting argument. The University is arguing that its salary proposals, whatever they might be, are by definition at the limit of their ability to pay as long as they do not disrupt the reasonable balance. This is most certainly not what the Collective Agreement says. It merely says that the cost of an award must preserve a reasonable balance. There are a range of costs that would preserve a reasonable balance and the arbitrator is obliged to make an award that is within that range. In the 2012 arbitration Arbitrator Taylor made that point clearly when he pointed out that just because the Association’s proposal of 5% and 5% general wage increase would disrupt the reasonable balance did not mean that the University’s proposal would be automatically awarded.
“The merits of the appropriate award (provided it is within the University’s ability to pay) are determined on the four enumerated criteria in the second half of Article 11.02(e)” (paragraph 85 of the award).
Those four enumerated are a) the need for the University to maintain its academic quality by retaining and attracting Faculty Members, Librarians, and Program Directors of the highest caliber, b) changes in the Vancouver and Canadian Consumer Price Indices, c) changes in British Columbian and Canadian Average Salaries and Wages, and d) salaries and benefits at other Canadian universities of comparable academic quality and size.
The Association is convinced that our proposals do not disrupt the “reasonable balance” between salaries and other expenditures. We also believe that our proposals are fully justified by the four enumerated criteria.
1. Quoted in Arbitrator Taylor’s award, UBC and UBCFA, 2013, paragraph 25.
2. McMaster University and McMaster University Faculty Association, 1990, pg. 8.
Next up on the blog: Arbitration Update
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Changes in Composition of the Bargaining Unit, 2006-2015
Posted on Wednesday, July 8, 2015 at 11:00 a.m.
categories: Bargaining Unit
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the twenty-fifth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute, as well as the arbitration process in general.
While some issues, like obtaining a reasonable general wage increase, are constants in bargaining, others evolve over time in response to changes in management practice or in the composition of the bargaining unit. For example, the kinds of workload complaints we hear now include issues that were largely absent in 2006.
One of the things that has changed over the past 9 years, and has changed the focus of our bargaining proposals, is the composition of the bargaining unit. Two trends stand out. First, there has been an increase in the relative size of the Educational Leadership and Lecturer groups. Second, there has been an increase in the number of members over the age of 71 (in 2006 members were forced to retire at age 65). Tables 1 and 2 provide headcounts by group for April 2006 and April 2015 for April 2006 and April 2015. The tables also provide the FTE count for Sessionals, as many of them do not have full-time appointments. These data were provided by UBC and are not completely accurate, but accurate enough for our purposes.
Table 1: Headcount (except where noted) by Group, April 2006
Table 2: Headcount (except where noted) by Group, April 2015
As Tables 1 and 2 indicate, the bargaining unit, in headcount terms, was a little over 6% larger in April 2015 than it was in April 2006. The largest group in each year was the Professoriate (“Prof”), although in percentage terms it declined from 69.2% to 67.7% of the bargaining unit. The two groups that showed the largest increase in percentage terms are the Educational Leadership group (“EdLeader”—Instructors, Senior Instructors and Professors of Teaching) and the Lecturer group, with increases of 159% and 123%, respectively. In absolute terms those two groups contributed 65% of the growth in the non-sessional faculty complement.
Sessional Lecturers (“Sess”) declined both in headcount and FTE numbers. It is important to note that some Sessional Lecturers work only in the Fall term, or only in the Summer, so the total number of different Sessional Lecturers who are members of our bargaining unit at some point during the year is considerably larger than the number captured in a single month “snapshot”. Some, probably most, of the decrease in Sessional Lecturers is explained as members moved from the Sessional Lecturer to the Lecturer classification. Both classifications, of course, are contract academic staff, with no access to tenure. Lecturers do not even have a right of reappointment.
The sex ratios within each group remained fairly constant. The current sex ratios, by group, are illustrated in Figure 1. The lengths of the sides of the rectangular fields in Figure 1 are proportional to the number of members with that attribute so that the areas of the rectangular fields that constitute a pair of attributes (women, sessional) are proportional to the number of observations in the data that have this combination of attributes.
Figure 1: Mosaic Plot of Sex and Group, 2015
In terms of the age distribution, the median age of members rose from 48.8 to 51.3 as a result of the elimination of mandatory retirement. However the number of members over the age of 71 is quite small. Although 7.5% of members were over the age of 65 in April 2015 only 1.5% were over the age of 71. The age distribution of members, in 2006 and 2015 is illustrated in Figure 2. The median age is indicated by the “notch” and the interquartile range by the length of the “boxes.” The ends of the “whiskers” represent the maximum and minimum ages.
Figure 2: Age Distribution by Sex, 2006 and 2015
Next up on the blog: A Reasonable Balance
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What Happens Now?
Posted on Wednesday, June 24, 2015 at 3:00 p.m.
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the twenty-fourth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute, as well as the arbitration process in general.
In the previous two rounds of bargaining, the parties continued to meet, even after the arbitration was scheduled, and in the 2010 round those meetings actually led to a settlement, which eliminated the need for an arbitration hearing. In this round the Association did suggest, in a phone conversation to the University, that we were prepared to meet further if they thought it would be fruitful but the University’s position seems to be that further meetings would be pointless. Thus, it looks like no further bargaining will take place. What happens now?
The Association and the University are preparing documents for the upcoming arbitration. On August 31, the parties will simultaneously exchange briefs outlining and defending our positions regarding the University’s ability to pay and our final positions on any other issues that are being taken to arbitration. The briefs that were submitted for the last arbitration can be found here (Faculty Association and University). The parties will then get an opportunity to respond to the other’s brief, in writing, by October 5. The reply submissions from the last arbitration can be found here (Faculty Association, University and University - Supplemental).
At the same time that the Association and the University exchange briefs and replies, these documents will also be given to the Arbitration Board. The Board comprises three members, one each chosen by the parties, and a chair who is chosen jointly by the parties. UBC proposed Colin Taylor as the Chair (again) and we agreed. Colin Taylor is a highly experienced and respected arbitrator with no discernible pro-union or pro-management proclivities. UBCFA has chosen Michael Conlin, the Executive Director of CUFA-BC, as its appointee. UBC has chosen Judith Osborne, the VP (legal) at Simon Fraser University. The appointees to the Board are not advocates for the parties. That’s what legal counsel is for. They are chosen for their experience and understanding of the issues at play. Once the hearings have been held (October 21-23), the Board will conduct discussions in private and render an award. The Board will use its best efforts to reach a unanimous award but failing that, a majority award.
Some members will remember that in the last round the parties mutually agreed to a single arbitrator, rather than the usual three member panel. That was the first time we had done so in an interest arbitration, although it is common in grievance arbitrations. We were not unhappy with the single arbitrator experiment but saw no real advantage to it over the traditional three-person panel approach, to which we have returned.
UBCFA’s counsel has also contracted with accounting firm PwC to conduct research and produce a document pertaining to the University’s ability to pay an award greater than it offered in bargaining. The University has indicated to us that, unlike the last arbitration, it does not intend to call an independent accounting firm to make its case.
In determining a salary award, the arbitration panel has to evaluate two issues. First, whether the cost of an award will “preserve a reasonable balance between the salary of members of the bargaining unit and other expenditures.” In the two most recent arbitrations, the University was found to have the ability to pay more than they were offering faculty. Second, once the Board is satisfied that the University has the ability to pay an award, it must consider both wage and price inflation, retention issues, and salaries and benefits at other Canadian universities of comparable academic quality and size.
If the last two arbitrations are anything to go by the University will attempt to prove that any award that costs more than the university’s offer would disrupt the reasonable balance between the salary of members of the bargaining unit and other expenditures. The Association will argue that the University can safely pay an award greater than offered and still maintain the reasonable balance. After the hearings the Board will render its award (usually several months after the hearings), and we will be done with this round of bargaining.
Next up on the blog: Changes in Composition of the Bargaining Unit
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History Behind Annual “Lump-sum Payment,” Part II
Posted on Wednesday, June 10, 2015 at 11:00 a.m.
categories: Lump-sum Payment, GWI, PDR, PDF
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the twenty-third in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute, and the fifteenth dealing with matters still in dispute.
In our previous blog we discussed how contingent productivity payments instituted in the 2004/06 bargaining round disappeared in the 2010/12 bargaining round. There were two such payments, one predicated on fundraising, which was converted into the annual lump-sum payment, and one predicated on Tri-Council research grants. The question remains, what happened to the contingent “research grant” productivity payments? These were payments, equal to 1% of “regular salary” that would be made in a lump sum at the end of the contract year, contingent on Tri-Council grant funding exceeding the preceding year’s by a certain amount.
The conversion of the contingent research grant payment into something that was not contingent was a complex problem. The condition had, at that time, only been met occasionally. Obtaining it in the future would require significantly increasing Tri-Council grants over time, which was an uncertain prospect. The Association concluded that the certainty equivalent of that uncertain occasional payment was no more than fifty cents on the dollar. In retrospect we believe that was the correct calculation. The University suggested that, rather than convert the 0.5% to an annual lump-sum payment, or a 0.5% general wage increase (GWI), it be converted into an increase in our annual Professional Development Funds. From our point of view that suggestion was attractive, but with some problems. First, since the contingent lump-sum payments, in the years they were paid, were calculated on the basis of regular salary, which increases with GWI, the total value of the payments increased as salaries increased to keep pace with inflation, and also as the membership grew. The Professional Development Fund payments only grow as the membership grows, but do not automatically increase in line with GWI, as the contingent productivity payments did. Second, all members got the productivity payments, but sessional lecturers without continuing appointments were not eligible for Professional Development, so the University’s proposal would, in effect, be a transfer from sessionals without continuing appointments to everybody else. Third, at the time, each year PD funds that were left unused for two years “disappeared” from member’s accounts, and were returned to the University. Despite these problems, we counter proposed a mechanism for transferring the contingent productivity payments into Professional Development Funds in a way that we felt maintained their value. Ultimately the University accepted our counter proposal.
First, we increased Professional Development Funds by $600 per eligible member from $500 to $1,100, and introduced PD for sessional lecturers without continuing appointments in the amount of $25 per credit taught.
Second, we increased the carry-over of PD funds from two years to five years to reduce wastage.
Third, we agreed that unused PD funds would not return to the University, but be placed in the pool of money used to pay Career Progress Increments (unused PD for sessional lecturers without continuing status was similarly recaptured, although in a different way). Career Progress Increments are part of base salary, and thus form part of the base upon which salary increases are calculated, which mitigates the fact that money that increases with GWI was being converted to money that did not increase with GWI. Further, the extra money that, under our proposal, gets paid into the Career Progress Pool is not just the unused amount from the $600 per person converted from the contingent productivity payment, but also unused amounts from the $500 per person that was already in existence, and that previously had been returned to the University. Again this mitigates the problem that PD funds do not increase with GWI, as the productivity payment did.
It is very unusual for a union to agree to take salary money that is subject to GWI and convert it into a fund that is not subject to GWI. In this case we felt that a) because we eliminated the contingent nature of the payment, b) because we met or exceeded our certainty equivalent valuation of the uncertain payment, and c) because of the specific changes we made to the PD Fund, we had found a way to make that transfer in a way that we thought provided increased value to the members. Looking back, we are still quite satisfied that we had at the very least preserved the total value of the old contingent productivity payments.
Next up on the blog: What Happens Now?
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History Behind Annual “Lump-sum Payment,” Part I
Posted on Wednesday, June 3, 2015 at 12:00 p.m.
categories: Lump-sum Payment, GWI
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the twenty-second in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute, and the fourteenth dealing with matters still in dispute.
Members who have joined UBC within the past ten years may wonder about Part 2, Article 5 (Lump Sum Payment) of the Collective Agreement, which states that on June 30 of each year all members will be paid a lump-sum amount equal to 1% of their “regular salary.” In other words, a small percentage of our annual salary compensation is “held back” from our bi-monthly paycheques and paid out in a lump sum at the end of the contract year. How did we come to such an unusual arrangement? An annual end-of-year lump-sum payment of 1% of salary has the same effect on members’ incomes as a one-time 1% general wage increase (GWI), ignoring some very minor interest rate effects, so what exactly is the point of this arrangement? To understand why this provision is in the Agreement it is necessary to know some history since this provision is part of a much larger story.
In the 2004-06 Collective Agreement the parties agreed that members would receive, at the end of the Agreement (June 30, 2006), one or both of two productivity payments, contingent on certain conditions being met. One was a payment of 1% of regular salary that every member would receive if fundraising efforts in 2005/06 exceeded $100 million (“the fundraising payment”). The second was a payment of 1% of regular salary that every member would receive if the University share of Tri-Council research funding for 2005/06 was at least $10 million more than it had been in 2004/05 (“the research grant payment”). Those were one-time bonuses.
In the 2006-10 Collective Agreement the parties agreed on a process to extend these payments into annual payments, again contingent on meeting certain targets. The language in the Agreement is almost indecipherable, but what it meant was that during the first year of the Agreement (2006/07) the parties would work out a way to make the productivity payments permanent based on the “demonstrable relevance of the bases, criteria, and measures for each of them.” That work was done, and what emerged was an agreement that both payments would be made annually, contingent on the conditions being met, and that the condition for the research grant payment would be that each year’s Tri-Council grant funding had to exceed the preceding year’s by a certain amount. It was an ever increasing target.
In the 2010-12 bargaining round the University came to the table with a proposal to eliminate the fundraising payment and make the research grant payment contingent on a more stringent condition, making it even more difficult to achieve. What we arrived at was quite different.
The parties agreed to eliminate any condition on the fundraising payment, given that the payment was contingent on a condition that had always been met. It simply became the annual end-of-year lump-sum payment we have today. To make a contingent payment non-contingent is obviously a good thing for the members, even if the condition on which it had been contingent had always been met, because one never knows what the future holds. We were pleased to achieve that outcome, but it’s not something either party costed against the Agreement.
This still begs the question: “Why an annual lump sum instead of a one-time GWI, since the two are equivalent?” In fact, the University did propose converting the 1% lump-sum payment into a 1% GWI, and the Association was willing to do that, but at a fair price. The annual 1% lump sum is only equivalent to a 1% GWI for individual members at the time of the conversion. For the Faculty Association as a whole the two are not equivalent. Currently UBC must make a 1% payment to every member now, and anyone who is hired in the future. By contrast, a 1% GWI only applies to members who are here at the time it is made. Members hired in the future would not receive it.
In a full-information world with rational agents, the existence of a 1% annual lump-sum payment would result in negotiated starting salaries being lower by exactly the amount of the payment. If that payment had been converted into a one-time GWI the effect would then be a compensating increase in negotiated starting salaries. That’s in a full-information world. However it is highly unlikely to be the case in a world characterized by asymmetric information. We are quite convinced that if we traded the 1% annual lump-sum payment for a 1% GWI, future members would, on average, not see their starting salaries rise fully by 1% over what they otherwise would have been. So the annual lump sum payment continues, an artifact of Collective Agreement provisions that soon will be completely forgotten.
Amusing story: While the Association understands the effect of the lump-sum payment on salary, the University claims not to. In the last round of bargaining leading up to and during arbitration the University repeatedly argued that the lump-sum payment represented a type of salary increase, equivalent to an annual GWI of 1%. We had to explain to the Arbitrator that if in Year 1 a faculty member’s salary was $100,000, the lump-sum payment would be $1,000, for a total salary of $101,000. In year two, if there was no GWI, the faculty member’s salary would still be $100,000, with a lump-sum payment of $1,000 at year end. Mystifyingly, the University tried to suggest to the Arbitrator that the lump-sum payment would increase the salary to $101,000 for year 2 (which if this were actually so, would mean the lump-sum payment for year 2 would be $1010). Fortunately, the Arbitrator was not fooled by the University’s numbers game.
Next up on the blog: History Behind Lump-sum Payment, Part II
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Part-time Sessional Benefit and Pension Issues
Posted on Wednesday, May 27, 2015 at 3:00 p.m.
categories: Sessionals, Pension
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the twenty-first in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute, and the thirteenth dealing with matters still in dispute.
This blog pertains to a proposal that the University has made in at least the past three rounds. It concerns Part 4 Article 2.03(f)(ii) which reads: “The following benefits are available to members of the bargaining unit with appointments of at least 1 year and 50% workloads and to Sessional Lecturers with appointments of at least 4 months and 50% workloads.” The problem with this provision is threefold. First, the definition of 50% workload changes from Faculty to Faculty. Second, summer sessional appointments are typically less than 4 months (even though courses taught during the Summer term are equal in contact hours to similar courses taught during the Winter term). Consequently, someone in Arts teaching two sections in the Summer term is ineligible for benefits, but in the Winter term the same person teaching the same two courses would be eligible. Third, if they teach less than half time, they get no pension contribution. In Arts, teaching one course in the Fall term, one course in the Spring term, and two in the summer generates no pension contribution, but teaching two courses in the Fall term, two in the Winter term, and none in the summer would generate pension contributions. Two different distributions within the year of the same amount of work, and same salary, but one is eligible for pension contributions and the other not.
To deal with the first situation, we proposed that a full-time workload should be defined as three courses per term, in all Faculties. This is also consistent with our proposal to standardize the minimum salary scale for all Faculties based on the 15 credit definition of full-time. The University’s position on this is a firm “no.”
To deal with the second situation, we proposed that if an amount of work would qualify for benefits in the Fall or Winter terms, the same amount of work would qualify for benefits in the Summer term. We had quite a bit of discussion about this proposal at the table, and were making some progress, but thus far the University has not agreed with our proposal, and it was not part of their “financial package.”
Members may remember our previous blog about our pension proposals (May 22, 2014). If not, we take this opportunity to point out again that in a defined contribution plan, such as we have at UBC, pension contributions are simply part of total compensation. It is grossly unjust that a member’s total compensation would be less if the work is spread thinly over the year than it would be if the work was concentrated in one or two terms. On this issue the University’s position is also a firm “no.”
These are inexpensive proposals that relate to fundamental fairness and equity between members. It’s not clear why the University is unwilling to solve these problems, but thus far the problems remain unresolved. These three benefit issues may head to arbitration, unless the University has a change of heart sometime before the arbitration.
Next up on the blog: History Behind Annual “Lump-sum Payment,” Part 1
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Posted on Wednesday, May 20, 2015 at 3:00 p.m.
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the twentieth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute, and the twelfth dealing with matters still in dispute.
The Association has been seeking, since 2010, to modify Part 5, Conditions of Appointment for Librarians, for two reasons:
- to ensure workload is collegially assigned in a fair and equitable manner; and
- to create Heads language for the Library that is essentially parallel to Heads language for faculty (i.e., term appointments, stipend, administrative leave).
Currently Librarians are governed by the same workload language as everybody else in the bargaining unit (Part 1, Article 13) which kind of works but is extremely awkward given librarian duties. In 2010, when we first started our resolve to change the language in the Collective Agreement about the Library, the Library didn’t have Heads in the conventional sense of academic department Heads. Instead UBC appointed Administrative Librarians who were more-or-less designed to be permanent Heads, a practice that was abandoned for faculty approximately in the early 1980s. In 2010 the University strongly opposed our position and argued that having Heads in the Library as term appointments made no sense. We dropped the proposal so we could consult more fully with our members in the Library prior to the 2012 round.
In 2012 the University did an about face, and was now in favour of faculty-like Heads, at least as regards to term. In fact their proposals were very much like our proposals. Although both parties now seemed to be working towards the same model, we had a hard time reaching agreement on every issue. In the end we agreed on some changes to the Collective Agreement that essentially introduced Heads into Part 5, Conditions of Appointment for Librarians. However there is no language in the Collective Agreement dealing with the selection, duties and compensation for Heads, nor any specific Librarian workload language. Workload is still covered by Part 1, Article 13.
In 2014 we again presented our proposals for workload language and Heads language. The University presented language that would lengthen Librarians’ probationary period. In the end, no agreement on new language could be reached because we could not even agree on the problems to be solved.
The parties did meet on May 12 in an attempt to reach further agreement on the Library, and did succeed in making one small change, but basically the parties are still on completely different pages about how the Library should work, and how librarians should be treated.
The University seems unable to find a consistent position. In 2010 it was opposed to Heads in the Library; in 2012 it was in favour; and now, in this round, it seems unwilling to move forward in a direction that would create meaningful Head positions. The real problem, to put it bluntly, is that the management of the Library is a disaster. Recently the University commissioned an External Review Committee comprising the Chief Librarians at the University of Toronto, McGill University, and UC Berkeley. In their report, they note “the internal poor morale", the "culture of negativity," and “the perception, which [the review panel] believe[s] to be real, of dysfunction and disarray within the executive leadership team.” Members can read the entire report here, the response of the University Librarian here, and the response of the Provost here. It all points to a Library structure that is not supportive of its librarians. We believe in our librarians, and the work they do. As the Provost notes, “a strong, cohesive leadership team is critical for the long term success of any organization.” Until that occurs it will be difficult to move forward at the bargaining table to improve the working conditions of our librarians.
Next up on the blog: Part-time Sessional Benefit and Pension Issues
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Tenured Assistant Professors
Posted on Wednesday, May 13, 2015 at 10:00 a.m.
categories: Tenure, Assistant Professors
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the nineteenth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute, and the eleventh dealing with matters still in dispute.
This blog pertains to a proposal that the University has made in at least the past three rounds of bargaining. It concerns Part 4 Article 2.03(f)(ii) which reads: “if an appointee is not granted a tenured appointment pursuant to (i) above, then in the seventh year of service a recommendation either to grant a tenured appointment at the rank of Assistant Professor or otherwise, or not to renew the appointment, must be made.” The University’s proposal is to modify that clause so that it would no longer be possible to grant tenure at the rank of Assistant Professor. The University’s position is first, that most research universities do not allow professors to be tenured at the Assistant rank; second, it negatively affects the prestige and status of the University; and third, that the people who have been tenured at the Assistant rank are unworthy and should have been dismissed instead of tenured.
With respect to the first point the Association does understand the concept of “industry standard.” Fewer research universities allow tenured Assistants than prohibit them. But UBC is not a leader in industry standard collective agreement language. For instance, our workload language is simply out of whack with industry standard, and especially with the University of Toronto. And second, the question is “what mischief is being done if someone is tenured as an Assistant Professor”? Not only do we not think any harm comes from allowing people to be tenured as Assistant Professors, we think it serves a very useful purpose in allowing departments to keep valued members who, for one reason or another, are not quite ready for promotion to Associate, but are meeting the standard for tenure.
With respect to the second point, UBC is regularly ranked as one of the top universities in the world. Does anybody really think our reputation is in any way affected by the fact that a few members are tenured as Assistants first, before being promoted to Associates? Or even that a very few people who are tenured as Assistants remain tenured Assistants for ten years or more? Some very high profile members of the UBCV campus have in fact been tenured without being promoted. And gone on to be highly productive at the University.
Now to the third point, that the people who have been tenured at the Assistant rank are unworthy and should have been dismissed instead of tenured. At the bargaining table it’s not uncommon to hear our members demeaned, and called names like “deadwood.” It’s something you get used to. But to sit there and hear that a number of our members, loyal valued employees, would have been dismissed if the University had had its way is pretty cold.
Anyway, we understand the University’s position, but we haven’t agreed to it. The University can withdraw it, or take it to arbitration.
Next up on the blog: Librarians
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Posted on Wednesday, May 6, 2015 at 11:00 a.m.
categories: Economic Benefits, Vision Care
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the eighteenth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute, and the tenth dealing with matters still in dispute.
In every bargaining round the benefit issue on which we get the second most comments from members in person and in our survey (after the Professional Development Fund) is vision care. Our vision care provision covers glasses (but not prescription sunglasses) and contact lenses to a maximum of $250 in any 24 month period, with two exceptions. Sessional Lecturers with less than a 50% appointment have to pay out of pocket for this benefit and faculty over the age of 71 get no vision care benefit at all. This has fallen behind industry standards, and is even behind the benefit level for other UBC employee groups.
At UBC, for the Administrative Executive group, the BCGEU on the Okanagan campus, and CUPE 2950 (library, clerical and theatre workers), the benefit covers the cost of contact lenses, eyeglasses or laser eye correction surgery to a maximum of $400 every 24 months. At CUPE 116 and CUPE 2278 (teaching assistants and markers) the benefit covers the cost of contact lenses, eyeglasses or laser eye correction surgery up to a maximum of $400 in any 24 month period for a person under age 19 or in any 36 month period for any other person (note that $400 every 36 months works out to more than $250 every 24 months).
Our proposal is to raise the benefit to $400 in any 24 month period per employee or dependent for glasses (including prescription sunglasses, which other employee groups on campus have covered), contacts, annual eye exams and laser correction surgery.
Regular readers of our blogs will be able to guess what UBC’s response has been to this proposal. In the last round of bargaining, the University said no to the proposal, and then at arbitration argued that it did not have the ability to pay any of our benefits proposals, including vision care, and the arbitrator did not award any benefits.
This year the University has again not agreed to our proposal. UBC has, however, made two counterproposals (the University made a total of three GWI proposals from which the bargaining committee could choose). Included in its GWI proposal of 5.2% over 5 years was an increase in the vision care maximum from $250 to $300. The University alternatively proposed that we accept a GWI offer of 5.15% over 5 years to have vision care increased to $400 every 24 months. In other words, the University proposed a substantial decrease in your GWI in exchange for either partial or full coverage on the vision care proposal. The University knows we cannot agree to a five year deal with a general wage increase well below inflation, so once again improvement in vision care benefits will be before the arbitrator.
Next up on the blog: Tenured Assistant Professors
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Professional Development Funds
Posted on Wednesday, April 29, 2015 at 12:00 p.m.
categories: Professional Development Funds
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the seventeenth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute, and the ninth dealing with matters still in dispute.
In every bargaining round the benefit issue on which we get the most comments from members in person and in our survey is the Professional Development Fund. No wonder. Our PD is the lowest in British Columbia, and among the lowest in Canada.
At SFU the PD Reimbursement benefit is $1,910, at UVic it’s $1,670 and at UNBC it’s $2,000. At Royal Roads faculty members have access to two funds: “Each April 1st, each full-time Faculty Member will have $1,200 deposited in his Personal Professional Development Account.” But, there are additional funds available as well: “On April 1st of each year, for each full-time Faculty Member the amount of $2,500 will be placed in the Professional Development Pool.” Faculty have to apply for funds from the pool (maximum $3,000) and not all applications may be fully funded.
Of course, then there is the University of Toronto, which is our most relevant comparator. In their last round of bargaining the UofT and the Faculty Association agreed that the Professional Expense Reimbursement Allowance (PERA) “will be $1600, except for Pre-Tenure and Pre-Promotion Teaching Stream and Pre-Permanent Status Librarians for whom PERA will be $1850.”
So where does UBC stand? $1,100 except for non-continuing Sessional Lecturers for whom it is $25 per credit taught ($75 for each three credit course).
Our proposal is to raise the PD Allowance to $35 per credit for non-continuing Sessional Lecturers and $1,750 for everyone else. UBC has not agreed with our proposal. Instead, it provided us with a proposal to “an increase in the Professional Development Reimbursement Fund from $1,100 to $1,200 of Professional Development reimbursement per year for Faculty Association Members, excluding Sessional Lecturers without continuing status” on the condition that we accept a general wage increase offer of 5.1% over 5 years. This salary increase is even lower than the Province’s proposed mandate and we would still have the lowest PD in the Province.
Because we cannot agree to a five-year deal with a general wage increase well below inflation our PD proposal will be put before the arbitrator.
Next up on the blog: Vision Care
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Tuition Fee Waiver Proposals
Posted on Thursday, April 23, 2015 at 2:00 p.m.
categories: Tuition Fee Waivers, Spousal Tuition Waivers, Dependent Tuition Waivers
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the sixteenth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute, and the eighth dealing with matters still in dispute.
We have two proposals for the tuition fee waiver benefit in Article 7.08 of Part 2 of the Collective Agreement: allowing spouses to qualify for the waiver and protecting the waiver for faculty member dependents enrolled at the University should the parent die during the student’s enrollment.
Currently the tuition fee waiver only applies to members and dependent children. Members are entitled to up to 12 credits a year, dependent children are eligible for up to 120 credits in an undergraduate degree program. In our face-to-face meetings and bargaining surveys many members asked us to modify the Collective Agreement so that the tuition fee waiver would apply to their spouses/partners.
Our first proposal is to allow members to transfer their tuition fee waiver to their spouses. This is not an increased benefit, but simply a change in who in a member’s family may receive the benefit. We think this is a very good family-friendly proposal. It has very little cost, and would help with recruitment and retention. We made the same proposal in the last round and the University strongly objected, arguing that “it is very difficult to cost” the proposal.
The second proposal concerns what happens to a dependent child who is enrolled in a degree program using the tuition fee waiver benefit, and the member tragically dies. Currently, the child loses the waiver. We proposed that in such circumstances the dependent child be allowed to maintain the benefit after the death of his or her parent. We are not proposing that dependent children have access to the benefit and be allowed to start a degree program after the death of a parent. We simply proposed protecting those students already registered in a degree program at the University at the time of their parent’s death.
When we went to interest arbitration in 2012, this was one of the issues we put to the arbitrator. The University stated in their brief to the arbitrator that it would cost the University $750 per year in total if it were to maintain this benefit for all enrolled students who lost a parent. The arbitrator did not make a ruling on any issues other than salary increases during that arbitration. During this round of bargaining, once again the University has not agreed to our proposal. We will once again put this issue before the arbitrator. The cost to the University of providing this benefit is so minimal that we are puzzled that this matter was not resolved during this round of bargaining.
Next up on the blog: Professional Development Funds
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Promotion and Tenure Procedures
Posted on Wednesday, April 15, 2015 at 1:00 p.m.
categories: Transparency, Promotion, Tenure
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the fifteenth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute, and the seventh dealing with matters still in dispute.
We have a number of specific issues pertaining to promotion and tenure procedures, some of which are technical and not contentious, but two are quite substantive, and we have not yet been able to reach agreement on any changes to the current language. This has been disappointing.
The first has to do with the use of anonymous student comments. We have had complaints from faculty members that some students use anonymous comments to make hateful and occasionally racist and sexist comments about faculty members. In our view, student comments should only be seen by the faculty member, because students have no accountability when they write unsigned comments. Moreover, allowing scurrilous comments to be seen by other faculty members in a tenure and promotion process without the permission of the member amounts to University-sanctioned bullying. We proposed that anonymous comments obtained through the student evaluations of teaching may only be added to promotion and tenure files with the permission of the candidate. The University not only disagreed with our perspective, but provided no defence for why unsigned comments should be given any weight in a review.
Our second concern has to do with the election of members to the Dean’s Advisory Committee. We have heard from a number of members that Deans are not actually holding elections for these committees, or when they hold elections, not all eligible members are given a chance to be nominated and/or to vote. Looking at the Collective Agreement, it’s clear why Deans and our members are confused about the process. There is no language in the Agreement that covers calls for nominations, length of term, etc. We proposed some simple procedures that represent best practices at other universities. The University was surprisingly resistant to our fairly logical proposal. It’s worrisome that the University resisted transparent election procedures. Good governance is always transparent.
Next up on the blog: Tuition Fee Waiver Proposals
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Why Workload Matters
Posted on Thursday, April 9, 2015 at 1:00 p.m.
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the fourteenth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute, and the sixth dealing with matters still in dispute.
Prior to the 2010 Bargaining Round the Association conducted its usual survey of its members. In that round, responding to many comments we had been receiving from members, we inserted a special section in the survey on workload. What we found was significant dissatisfaction with the transparency and equity of workload assignments, as well as a concern that many members were suffering from unhealthy workloads and difficult work-life balance challenges. At that time we developed a proposal to the University on faculty workload that aimed to make sure that our members would experience a healthy and productive work environment, with workloads assigned collegially, fairly and equitably. We based our proposal on workload language at other universities like the University of Toronto, Western and Queens, but particularly focussed on the University of Toronto.
The Association believes that the workload policy at the University of Toronto contributes to its number 1 status in Canada, as well as being ranked as the top Canadian university internationally. In the 2014 survey we asked if members supported the Association in its emphasis on continuing to achieve workload language that is similar to the University of Toronto, and received a strong positive response.
However, as a result of the destructive budgeting process that UBC has adopted, we are increasingly hearing complaints not just about the transparency and fairness of workload allocation, but the overall amount of work that faculty are being expected to do. Members comment on having to deal with increased student numbers, higher research expectations, and more and more downloaded administrative work with fewer resources, less support, and in some departments, fewer colleagues. This is a problem that our proposals do not adequately address and why we will continue to bring workload issues to the bargaining table.
In this round we have focussed on five specific goals:
- First, to introduce the kind of language around the development of equitable departmental policies on normal teaching loads similar to the approach at the University of Toronto.
- Second, to ensure members with joint appointments are assigned teaching and service duties consistent with their appointments.
- Third, that there should not be significant discrepancies in workload in the same disciplinary areas between the Vancouver and Okanagan campuses.
- Fourth, that in the interest of scholarly activity and educational leadership, faculty shall not be required to teach in more than two four-month terms, or the equivalent, in any academic year, nor shall they be pressured to volunteer to do so.
- Fifth, that faculty members in the Lecturer classifications shall not be assigned more than eight three-credit courses, or their equivalent, in any academic year. Each of these goals is designed to address different specific problems that are raised frequently by our members.
In all cases our proposals are “industry standard.” Although we model our teaching load language on the University of Toronto’s, every major research university in Canada has some version of the same language. Language to ensure a research/educational leadership term without teaching assignments exists not just in major research universities, but in pretty much every university in Canada. Equity language for joint appointments is common, as is cross campus equity language (in universities with multiple campuses).
As for Lecturers’ workloads – therein lies a tale. In Canada most contract academic staff are paid based on how much teaching they do (like Sessional Lecturers). The situation with Lecturers at UBC is a bit unusual. They are salaried employees and, once hired, their salary can only rise with general wage increases, career progress increments, merit and PSA. Thus, their salary is unrelated to the number of courses they teach. Consequently, there is nothing in the Collective Agreement that prevents the University from increasing the number of courses assigned to Lecturers to the point that, on a per-course basis, they earn less than the Sessional minimum scale. In fact, we did receive comments from Lecturers claiming that they were being paid less than Sessional Lecturers. Upon investigation we discovered that in some departments Lecturers were being hired at such low annual salaries that a workload of any more than 8 courses per year would indeed result in per course compensation below what Sessional Lecturers are paid.
We had some considerable discussion with UBC over our workload proposals, but ultimately the University informed us that they were unwilling to agree to any workload language. The clear implication was that the University wanted to reserve the right to increase teaching loads in order to deal with budgetary issues rather than use the University’s considerable annual budget surplus to provide adequate budgetary support for the academic mission of the institution.
We feel strongly that workload issues must be addressed, and we will be taking this issue to arbitration.
Next up on the blog: Promotion and Tenure Procedures
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Lecturer Appointments and Reappointments
Posted on Tuesday, April 7, 2015 at 12:00 p.m.
categories: Lecturers, Appointments and Reappointments
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the thirteenth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute, and the fifth dealing with matters still in dispute.
The Association has several proposals that relate to Lecturers but some pertain to workloads which will be covered in different blogs. In this blog we are focussing on their appointments and reappointments.
Lecturers are completely anomalous in the Collective Agreement. Unlike every other classification, there is no language pertaining to either their appointment or reappointment. There are more than 225 Lecturers in the bargaining unit; the vast majority are on 12-month contracts. Normally Lecturer appointments run from July 1 to June 31 and if they are reappointed, which is typical, they are considered continuing members and entitled to career progress increments, merit and PSA awards. Clearly these are faculty members who are expected to continue in their jobs over time. Yet, unlike Sessionals, Lecturers have no right to reappointment, and unlike every other member in the bargaining unit, there is no process for appointment of Lecturers. The normal procedures for appointment contained in Part 4, Article 5, explicitly exclude Lecturers. We have made two proposals in this regard. First, that as a general principle, Lecturers have the right to reappointment and that the only reasons for non-renewal of appointment of a Lecturer shall be teaching performance, lack of funding, or discontinuance or non-scheduling of courses or sections. Second, that appointments to new Lecturer positions be made from qualified Sessional candidates who apply internally, when there are such candidates.
We believe these proposals to be fair and reasonable and would reassure Lecturers that they are valued members of the UBC community.
Next up on the blog: Workload
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Sessionals: Appointments and Salaries
Posted on Wednesday, April 1, 2015 at 12:00 p.m.
categories: Sessionals, Appointments and Reappointments, Salary Scale
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the twelfth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute, and the fourth dealing with matters still in dispute.
The Association has a number of proposals that relate to Sessionals but many pertain to benefits or workloads, which will be covered in different blogs. In this blog we are focussing on two other issues: right to accrue work and salary.
Right to Accrue Additional Work
Currently continuing Sessional Lecturers have the right to an annual appointment “for a period of time equal to the same length of time and on the same basis, full- or part-time, as the appointment he or she held in the winter session of the academic year (July to June) in which the Continuing Appointment becomes effective.” Non-continuing Sessional Lecturers have a right to reappointment of one course per year. In terms of work assignment, Sessional Lecturers come dead last. Work available to Sessional Lecturers, over and above the minimum to which they are entitled, is residually determined after all other teaching classifications are assigned work. There often are additional course assignments available over and above the minimum required assignments.
You might think that, in any given department, any additional course assignments would be given to Sessional Lecturers who had previously taught that course, or at least to Sessional Lecturers who are qualified to teach that course, and that the longer the service the member has given, the more secure they should be in their ability to acquire additional course assignments up to a full-time load. But that is not what happens. Often, without cause, very senior Sessional Lecturers are denied courses that they have been teaching for years, and every Sessional Lecturer is potentially in the perpetual state of continually having to apply for their own jobs. One member wrote us and suggested that having to reapply annually for their jobs is “a reminder to sessional faculty that our status in the University is precarious, that our jobs are not secure, and, by implication, that we should not complain or resist in any way because our livelihood might legally by taken from us at any moment.” Well put.
Not all Sessional Lecturers want additional course assignments, over and above the amount to which they are entitled, but our proposal is that for those who do, they be entitled to accrue, out of this pool of extra work, courses for which they are qualified, on a seniority basis, up to full-time.
Sessional Salary Scales
This has been a long-standing issue for the Association and was identified as one of the top issues to be solved by the Sessional Faculty Committee in the past several rounds of bargaining. Simply put, the minimum salary a Sessional Lecturer can earn per course depends on the Faculty they are in. In Education, for example, new Sessional Lecturers can be hired at $3,756 per three-credit course. In Arts, the minimum salary for a new Sessional Lecturer would be $6,254. That seems an unwarranted difference. Our proposal would be for the minimum salary scale for all Sessional Lecturers, regardless of Faculty, to be the same as the one that currently applies to Arts.
These proposals are hardly new: In our Bargaining Blog of April 27, 2012 (i.e., the last round of bargaining) we said: “The Association is proposing [three] simple, yet important, modifications to the existing language pertaining to Sessional Lecturers…. [T]o give Sessional Lecturers the right to accrue, on a seniority basis, courses in the ‘sessional pool’ for which they are qualified. [And] to ensure that 12-month Lecturer appointments are filled internally, from the pool of Sessional Lecturers, and are only advertised externally in the absence of qualified internal applicants.” Although these proposals may seem modest, we think they will improve the job security of that one-quarter of our members currently employed precariously as contract academic faculty. In other words, our position has not changed.
In our Bargaining Blog of June 8, 2010 (yes, two rounds ago), we said: “The current way of calculating the minimum pay for a 3-credit course cannot be justified by the University. Minimum scales don’t mean that everyone gets paid the same; they just establish a reasonable base-line upon which to build. Though we accept that there are market differences across disciplines, determining minimum scales based on an invented and fluctuating notion of full-time teaching loads is arbitrary at best. Our proposal on minimum scales emphasizes that a 3-credit course is a 3-credit course, no matter what Faculty it’s taught in. We’ve proposed that the standard scale should be the one currently governing the majority of Sessional Lecturers: Faculties of Arts, Science, Medicine, and Health Sciences.”
These are long-standing problems with simple solutions. Once again we will be arguing our case before the Arbitrator. If UBC had more respect for its Sessionals, we wouldn’t have to make our case to the Arbitrator. Our proposals are sensible, fair, and very inexpensive.
Next up on the blog: Lecturers’ appointment and right of reappointment
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Benefit Cuts for Members Past Age 71
Posted on Wednesday, March 25, 2015 at 10:00 a.m.
categories: Benefits, Total Compensation, Two-Tiered Compensation
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the eleventh in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute, and the third dealing with matters still in dispute.
Members who continue to work past the age of 71 lose health and welfare benefits provided by the University, as well as the 10 percent equivalent of their salary that the University contributes into the Faculty Pension Plan. These conditions result in a significant drop in the total compensation members receive from the University once they turn 71.
Part 2, Article 7.12 of the Collective Agreement reads: “The following benefit plans available to members under the age of 65 remain in place for members who work past their Normal Retirement Date in accordance with the terms of the plans: Extended Health Plan; Dental Plan; Optional Life Insurance for Members; Medical Services Plan; Employee and Family Assistance Plan; Professional Development Reimbursement Fund; Dependent Benefits Coverage Following Death of a Member.” On its face this looks like a no discrimination clause, but the key, and problematic, phrase is this: “in accordance with the terms of the plans”. The PD Reimbursement Fund and the Dependent Benefits Coverage plan are not at issue, as those “plans” are described in the Collective Agreement, although there was a temporary restriction on PD funds for members over 71, which has since been rectified. The Medical Services plan is employee-paid, so that’s not an issue. The big issue arises with Extended Health and Dental coverage, which UBC has contracted with Sun Life to administer. The plan can be found at hr.ubc.ca/benefits/files/faculty-health-dental-booklet.pdf. One of the features of the plan is that coverage expires at the end of the year in which a member turns 71.
This provision causes serious hardship to members. When members continue to be employed past 71, they must purchase the more restrictive post-retirement plan (see Retirement and Survivor Benefits for additional information) or private insurance.* Whether they purchase insurance through RSB or privately, their costs would be higher and benefits lower than would be the case for their younger colleagues. Further, many post-71 members continue to travel as part of their professional duties and yet they don’t have any University-paid insurance should they suffer an accident or injury while performing their duties as faculty members.
The Association has proposed changing the benefits provision so that all members would continue to be eligible until they retired from the University. This is such a low cost item, but UBC has been clear and unequivocal in its position. It’s not about the cost, but about wanting to discourage faculty from continuing to work beyond the age of 71. While the University acknowledged during bargaining that the issue of faculty members travelling on University business without insurance might be something to be addressed, no such proposal was forthcoming.
The second post-71 issue regards the Faculty Pension Plan (FPP). Currently the University reduces total compensation paid to members once they turn 71 by discontinuing contributions to the Faculty Pension Plan, with the explanation that CRA rules require that individuals begin to draw on their pension no later than December 1 of the year in which they turn 71, and no more contributions can be made to the plan. While true, the University has not made any arrangement to continue to pay that portion of total compensation that previously was paid as pension contribution. To get a more fulsome description of this issue, read "Our Pension Proposal". Our proposal is to reach agreement on a mechanism to maintain the same total compensation after age 70 as before age 70 because we do not support members receiving different compensation on the basis of age.
This is an important issue for us and we expect the University to work with us to develop a mechanism for maintaining the 10% salary equivalent, albeit in a plan outside of the FPP.
The University saves very little (approximately fourteen one-hundredths of one percent of their total salary bill) by reducing the total compensation of members over 71 through the elimination of extended health and dental plans, and pension contributions. If the University does not agree to our proposal to maintain the total compensation of all members, we will investigate the issue further to ensure that our members are not being discriminated against on the basis of their age.
* (March 25, 2015, 1:20 pm) An earlier version of this blog incorrectly stated that post-71 employees are not eligible to purchase retirement benefits. This was based on information on a UBC webpage, which turned out to be incomplete. We have since discovered that post-71 members are also entitled to join the RSB.
Next up on the blog: Sessional Issues
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General Wage Increase (GWI) Proposal Explained
Posted on Wednesday, March 18, 2015 at 9:00 a.m.
categories: Salaries, Salary Increases, Inflation
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the tenth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute, and the second dealing with matters still in dispute.
The purpose of the general wage increase (GWI), as Arbitrator Taylor put it, is “to keep pace with inflation and the general state of salaries elsewhere.” [2013 arbitration decision, UBC vs UBCFA, paragraph 111, page 51]. The Collective Agreement Part 1, Article 11.02eii)actually refers to two different price inflation rates: changes in the Vancouver and Canadian Consumer Price Indices. However for purposes of analysis and prediction it is sufficient to look only at a single index. We explain our proposed general increase below.
All Consumer Price Indices tend to move together, and any deviations in rates of change are inherently short term and unpredictable. This point is illustrated by comparing the Canadian, BC, and Vancouver inflation rates over the past 35 years or so, in Figure 1. The horizontal black line is set at 2%.
Source: Statistics Canada. Table 326-0020 - Consumer Price Index (CPI), 2011 basket, monthly (2002=100), CANSIM (database). (accessed: 2015-02-08)
The inflation rate in Canada, and in every province and city in Canada, is a product of the Bank of Canada’s monetary policy, which in turn is determined by the Bank of Canada’s inflation target rate. Since 1991 the target range has been 1 to 3 per cent, with the Bank's monetary policy aimed at keeping inflation at the 2 per cent target midpoint. The inflation-control target was adopted in 1991 and most recently has been renewed to the end of 2016. Figure 1 demonstrates how effective the Bank’s targeting policy has been in achieving its 2% target.
While short term deviations do occur, they are largely unpredictable, but the Association’s view is that, while forecasting inflation rates over the next few years, the only reasonable prediction is that inflation, in all jurisdictions, will average 2% per year.
The general state of salaries elsewhere
In terms of “the general state of salaries elsewhere” the Collective Agreement (Part 1, Article 11.02eiii-iv) actually provides two comparators. The first is “changes in British Columbian and Canadian Average Salaries and Wages.” This acknowledges that our wage increases should keep pace with wage inflation generally. The second is “wages and benefits” at comparable universities. This acknowledges that our wage increases should keep pace with wage increases generally, but also particularly with wages at other universities.
Wage Inflation, measured by increases in average weekly wages, tends to be higher than price inflation, measured by changes in the Consumer Price Index. Over the past ten years, on average wage inflation in BC and in Canada have been 1.2 percentage points and 1.0 percentage points higher, respectively, than the corresponding price inflation rates. (E.g.; while Canada’s price inflation averaged 1.8% over the past 10 years, Canada’s wage inflation averaged 2.8%.)
It is hard to quantify how much our wages are below the level that would be appropriate for a university of our size and quality. The position of the Association is that our wages should be comparable to those at the University of Toronto. UBC, by pretty much every measure, is ranked second only to the U of T in Canada in terms of international recognition. By contrast, our wage levels are not second highest in the country and our relative position seems to have been slipping in recent years.
The Collective Agreement provides no guidance on how price, general wage inflation, and wages at comparable universities should be weighted, but the implication of the Agreement seems to be that an appropriate wage increase would be somewhere in the middle of these three measures.
Real salaries are salaries measured by how much actual purchasing power is provided by nominal salaries. Since prices tend to rise by an average of 2% per year (approximately 0.165% per month), once your monthly salary is determined on July 1 of any year the spending power of that salary will start to decline every month until, by June 31 of the following year, your command over goods and services has declined by 2%. If our Collective Agreement had a cost of living adjustment (COLA), salaries would automatically increase each July 1 to compensate for the inflation of the past year. Instead, our actual real wages have exhibited quite a different pattern with GWI sometimes being less than inflation, sometimes for many years in a row, and occasionally settlements being greater than inflation, allowing for “catch-up.” Unfortunately, catch-up is hard to achieve, especially in arbitration.
To visualize the effects of inflation on salaries, we calculated the trajectory of a salary corresponding to a nominal salary of $5,316 per month in June of 1980. After over 20 years of annual GWI (which ranged from 0% to 18% over that period) that nominal salary would have grown to $10,000 per month by June 2002 and $12,545 by June of 2014. By correcting the nominal salary for the value of the Canadian Consumer Price Index (set at 100 in June 2002) we convert the nominal salaries into real salaries. Figure 2 illustrates the actual trajectory of real salaries.
It is obvious that the historic relationship between inflation and GWI can be described as having four phases. The first phase occurs during the high inflation period of the early 1980s when GWI fell far short of inflation. The second phase occurs during the late 1980s and early 1990s when lower inflation, coupled with reasonable GWI held real salary approximately constant. The third phase was the gradual loss of real income in the late 1990s, as a result of six consecutive years of very low GWI. Only the last phase (what we think of as the modern era that starts with UBCFA unionizing in 2000) demonstrates the pattern you would expect, with periods of below inflation GWI being followed by periods of above inflation GWI. Figure 2 also illustrates why it is so important not to allow prolonged periods of below inflation GWI – we will probably never be able to catch up.
To further illustrate this point, in Figure 3 we focus in on the last 7 years and consider the difference between the real salaries we experienced after the arbitration award and the real salaries we would have experienced had we accepted UBC’s salary proposal in the last round. Had we accepted UBC’s salary offer the real salary in this example would be almost $100 per month less than it would be under the actual salary settlement. While this may not appear to be a large loss, it compounds over one’s career, and experience has taught us that it is very difficult to make up these losses subsequently.
GWI Proposals in the Current Round
Currently the Association and the University are at an impasse on the matter of GWI. The Association’s position is for a GWI of 3% on each of July 1, 2014 and July 1, 2015. We propose a two year deal. Keep in mind that the purpose of GWI is to keep pace with inflation and the general state of salaries at other comparable universities. The Association contends, and Arbitrator Taylor agreed, that salaries at UBC have fallen somewhat behind its relative place in terms of academic quality [2013 arbitration decision, UBC vs UBCFA, paragraph 104, page 49]. Given an expected inflation rate of 2% per year, general wage inflation at 3% per year, and the need for our salary levels to be more commensurate with those at comparator universities, we believe a settlement of 3% and 3% is reasonable.
The University is proposing a 5 year agreement as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. University's Proposed Salary Increases*
|July 1, 2014||0.0%|
|July 1, 2015||0.9%|
|July 1, 2016||0.4%|
|May 1, 2017||1.0%|
|July 1, 2017||0.4%|
|May 1, 2018||1.0%|
|July 1, 2018||0.5%|
|May 1, 2019||1.0%|
*the University proposed three slightly different alternatives. This illustrates their alternative 1.
The University’s proposal works out to a little over 1% per year over a five year period where we can expect inflation of 2% a year. In other words the University has proposed a deliberate and prolonged diminution of real salaries!
To illustrate the difference between the Association’s and the University’s proposals, Figure 4 has projected out real salaries (assuming 2% inflation) generated by each. Under the Faculty Association’s proposal real salaries should rise, by June 2016, to the level last seen in early 2010. Under the University’s proposal real salaries will fall to a level below our historic low of June 2008.
The last round of bargaining occurred during a period of unusually low price inflation in British Columbia, in part because of the HST debacle. In his 2013 Award Arbitrator Taylor found that “the factor of [price inflation] would tend to support an annual increase of 1.5%.” He made this ruling before inflation rates in 2013-14 became known. Inflation did rebound considerably in the second year and his overall estimate was a bit low, but reasonable under the circumstances. He further ruled that wage inflation would “tend to support an annual increase of 2.5%.” His estimate that wage inflation would run 1% higher than price inflation was exactly correct in our view. Arbitrator Taylor then argued that taking price inflation and wage inflation together, these two factors would tend to support an annual increase of 2.0%. However taking into account salaries and benefits at other Canadian universities of comparable academic quality and size brought his final award to 2.5% each year for two years [2013 arbitration decision, UBC vs UBCFA, paragraph 121, pages 54-55].
In our estimation, a price inflation estimate of 2% and a wage inflation estimate of 3% in the current round is appropriate. Given that, and given our need to recapture lost ground against other universities, an overall GWI of 3% is called for this year.
Next up on the blog: Benefits for members past age 71
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UPDATE: University Proposes to Implement PTR Increases
Posted on Friday, March 13, 2015 at 2:00 pm
categories: Salary, Career Advancement
In our bargaining blog this week, we discussed our proposal to remove the contract-specific dates on which PTR increases (CPI, Merit, and PSA) are implemented so that faculty members would receive anticipated annual salary increases even when we have not finished negotiating the next collective agreement. While the University has not agreed to this proposal, President Gupta has assured the Faculty Association that interest accrued on our delayed salary increases has nothing to do with the University’s position on this issue. We accept unequivocally his assurances.
It turns out that when President Gupta learned that the arbitration on our collective agreement would not take place until late October, he had initiated the processes necessary to present to the Faculty Association a proposal to implement PTR increases before the arbitration without prejudice to either parties’ positions in bargaining. There are many technical steps in making this proposal, and our bargaining blog was published before the Administration had an opportunity to communicate this proposal to the Faculty Association.
We are pleased to share the good news that the University is proposing to the Faculty Association that the University implement CPI, Merit, and PSA increases for faculty members for 2014 before the arbitration. Naturally, the Faculty Association has agreed to this.
The University and the Faculty Association will release a joint communication shortly to all members eligible for PTR.
Next up on the blog: General Wage Increase (GWI) Proposal Explained
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Progress Through the Ranks (PTR)
Posted on Wednesday, March 11, 2015 at 10:00 am
categories: Salary, Career Advancement
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are still a number of issues in still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. This is the ninth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute, and the first dealing with matters still in dispute.
Salary increases to individual members fall into two categories: General Wage Increases (GWI), and Progress Through the Ranks (PTR). GWIs are intended to protect members against inflation and maintain salary comparability with faculty at other universities of comparable academic quality and size. PTR is intended to reward individuals’ career advancement. The provisions of Progress Through the Ranks are contained in Part 2, Sections 2.02 through 2.05 of the Collective Agreement.
PTR ensures that members of the bargaining unit receive salary adjustments to recognize the increased contribution to the University over time that comes from years of experience and career progress. Thus, PTR is distinct from any general increases for inflationary purposes.
Our PTR system (sometimes called the Career Advancement Plan) is similar to that at many other universities. The value of the PTR “pool” is determined as 2.5% of the total salary of eligible members (1.25% for Career Progress Increments, 0.75% for Merit, and 0.5% for PSA). While not the highest in Canada, the percentage value, at 2.5%, is pretty typical.
We are trying to solve three main problems with our PTR proposals. First, the existing language pertaining to the PTR plan contains specific dates for the distribution of this money to faculty members. The 2012-2014 Collective Agreement specifies that the 2.5% be allocated on July 1, 2012 and July 1, 2013. Normally what would happen is that the 2014-2016 Collective Agreement would specify new dates: July 1, 2014 and July 1, 2015. However since negotiations to renew the Collective Agreement weren’t completed by July 1, 2014 those payments have been delayed. This happens every bargaining round and is always a source of considerable irritation by the members. We have proposed, again, to replace the specific dates with the phrase “July 1 of each year” in which case the PTR increases could be paid out even after the Agreement expires and negotiations are still ongoing. At almost every other comparator university in Canada, and in every other bargaining unit at UBC, increments are paid annually on a specific date, notwithstanding the fact that the Collective Agreement has expired. Real mischief is done to our members by the current state of affairs. Since UBC withholds the PTR increases until the end of bargaining (and the several months afterwards it takes payroll to reprogram the system) implicit interest on salaries (and actual interest on pensions) is being denied to members (it doesn’t disappear, UBC keeps the interest for itself).
UBC has remained consistently resistant to accepting our proposal, even though it would simplify things both for the University and for the members. It is hard to understand UBC’s resistance to this very sensible proposal (unless it’s just about them keeping the interest). To date the University has made no suggestion to us that it is willing to pay out PTR in advance of the completion of arbitration. If they wish to pay out the PTR we will certainly facilitate it, as we have in the past. However the University’s current position does mean that the earliest you will see the July 2014 increases is likely to be in Spring of 2016, which further supports speculation about the interest.
Our second problem has to do, not with the 2.5% overall pool of PTR nor the division into 1.25% for Career Progress Increments, 0.75% for Merit, and 0.5% for PSA (neither party has proposed any changes to this). It has to do with the way the actual dollar value of a CPI increment (and thus of a Merit unit) is calculated. Currently the university calculates the size of the CPI pool, then estimates how many CPI units are to be awarded, divides the former by the latter, and derives the value of an individual CPI unit. Consequently the values of CPI units are partly determined by how many increments are due in any given year, and this is subject to significant random variation. As a result the value of a CPI unit, rather than rising smoothly in concert with the GWI, rises erratically. For example between 2012/13 and 2013/14 the value of a CPI unit rose by 3.2%, while GWI was 2.45% but between 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 the value of a CPI unit rose by almost 8% while GWI was 0%. This produces some salary compression, and some random variations in career earnings. For example, an Assistant Professor hired in 2009 would have received, in CPI alone, 20.8% more during his or her first two years than somebody hired just four years previously would have earned in CPI in his or her first two years. These differentials obviously compound over time. Our proposal is to have the CPI value rise with inflation rather than be determined residually. This makes good sense, and we worked out a way to ensure that the size of the total CPI pool would not be affected, so there is no cost implication to the University. The University rejected this proposal.
Our third proposal is to allow merit to be awarded in ½ unit amounts. Currently it can only be awarded in 1, 1½, 2, 2½, and 3 unit amounts. This will be particularly helpful for members in cross-appointments and also provides more flexibility when members are equally meritorious, but the merit pool is not large enough to reward all meritorious members.
In the 2012 round of bargaining, we made essentially the same proposals with respect to the dates, the CPI value, and the ½ merit unit, and failing agreement, took the proposals to Arbitration. The university argued that none of our proposals should be awarded, and the Arbitrator agreed. Obviously we intend to redouble our efforts to convince the Arbitrator of the value of our proposals this time.
It may be possible for the parties to reach agreement on these proposals before Arbitration begins. A number of proposals, counter proposals and counter-counter proposals were exchanged on this matter in an attempt to reach an agreement, but as yet no agreement has been reached, and our discussions at the table are without prejudice to the parties’ positions at Arbitration.
Next up on the blog: University Proposes to Implement PTR Increases
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Article 17: Preservation of Past Rights and Practices
Posted on Thursday, March 5, 2015 at 10:00 am
categories: article 17, consultation
On Friday, January 30, 2015 the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. This is the eighth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute.
As long as anybody on the bargaining team can remember, UBC has been proposing to eliminate or suspend Article 17 in Part 1 of the Collective Agreement. Article 17 is entitled “Preservation of Past Rights and Practices” and it reads, in its entirety, “Subject to this Agreement or any amendments thereto or to any Collective Agreement the University agrees not to change rights of or practices relating to Faculty Members or members of the bargaining unit that traditionally have been the subject of consultation and discussion without appropriate consultation and discussion at the Departmental, Faculty or University level.”
This article is obviously very important to the Association as it is the University’s obligation to abide by the longstanding traditions of shared academic governance in the academy and not to make unilateral changes to matters that have traditionally been the subject of consultation. We have never really understood why the University brings this proposal back each year. The University has always responded that it wants to be able to discuss an issue with us (i.e. the Union) without committing itself to future consultations. This never made any sense to us. First, the article clearly encompasses more than discussions with the Faculty Association. Why get rid of the consultation at the Departmental, Faculty or University level if the problem is consultation at the Faculty Association level? Second, UBCFA is always entitled to make any proposal pertaining to the working conditions of its members at the bargaining table and the University is obliged to negotiate these matters in good faith. If we want to talk about something, we can always bring it to the table (admittedly only during bargaining rounds, not during the period of the Collective Agreement.)
Nonetheless, the matter was clearly very important to the University and, in the spirit of attempting to come to an agreement with the University, the Association agreed, not to eliminate or change the existing article, but to add a second paragraph making it clear that, for the period of the Collective Agreement, the University can discuss matters with the Association without obligating themselves to further consultation. We hope this added paragraph will indeed lead to even greater consultation between the Parties about matters that affect the employment conditions of our members.
Next up on the blog: Progress Through the Ranks (PTR)
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President’s Right to Consult re: Tenure and Promotion
Posted on Tuesday, March 3, 2015 at 10:00 am
categories: tenure, promotion
On Friday, January 30, 2015 the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. This is the seventh in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute.
The University proposed (UBC Proposal #6c) that the President should have the right to consult with the Provosts or Deputy Vice Chancellor regarding tenure and/or promotion decisions. (To explain, members should know that UBC has two different positions called “Provost”, one for each campus, and one position called “Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Principal” in the Okanagan).
The Faculty Association questioned why the President needed to consult yet more people for promotion and tenure decisions. There are already a large number of steps in the tenure and promotion processes. The department makes a recommendation, the Head makes a separate recommendation, the Dean makes a recommendation, SAC makes a recommendation, and after all that the President can request a further review by the Dean. How much can the Provosts or DVC add at this stage? The University explained that the President might need a “sounding board.”
The Association wasn't really convinced this was necessary, but in the end we did agree to allow this, provided that these were the only other people the President would consult, and provided that if the Provosts or Deputy Vice Chancellor raise serious concerns about the candidacy or any new negative information or serious concerns were introduced during the consultation, the candidate would be informed and given an opportunity to respond in writing.
Next up on the blog: Article 17: Preservation of Past Rights and Practices
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Titles and Ranks, Appendix A and Other Issues
Posted on Wednesday, February 25, 2015 at 10:00 am
categories: ranks, Appendix A, housekeeping
On Friday, January 30, 2015 the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the sixth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute.
Inevitably over the period in which a Collective Agreement is in force, either the Association or the University finds minor, technical matters that need addressing. This blog outlines some of those issues.
- The Ranks and Titles section of the Agreement (Part 4, Article 5) has a strange array of ranks. The seven described ranks are: Instructor I, Instructor II, Senior Instructor, Professor of Teaching, Assistant Professor, Associate Professor, Professor. The uninformed reader might conclude that the first four ranks comprised the Educational Leadership stream and the last three comprised the Professorial stream. Not so. Instructor I does not, as you might expect, lead to Instructor II. Instructor II in fact is a rank in the Professorial stream reserved for those who might otherwise be hired as Assistant Professors, but who, at the date of hire, have not yet completed their terminal degree. This rank needed to be renamed for clarity. The parties agreed to rename Instructor I as Instructor, and to rename Instructor II as Acting Assistant Professor.
- Appendix A in Part I lists all of the academic employees who for one reason or another (normally because they hold management positions) are excluded from the bargaining unit. During their time out of the bargaining unit, these individuals no longer have the rights and protections of the Collective Agreement, so this is a list with important implications. Many will remember the dust up in the 2010 round when the University tried to take both Associate Deans and Heads out of the bargaining unit. We agreed on the proposal with respect to Associate Deans, based on the University’s assertion that Associate Deans hold management positions, but we held firm on Heads, who clearly do not.
Appendix A also included “Faculty members appointed to the University’s Negotiating Committee.” The notion that the University could pluck faculty members out of the bargaining unit, have them potentially work against the interests of their colleagues, and then dump them back into the bargaining unit is so absurd we assumed the language was left over from the days before UBCFA became a union. In the 2010 and 2012 rounds, the University refused to change this language. During the 2010 round we had some mediation, and the mediator confessed to our team that the Labour Board would not support the University’s position on this. Not that this made any difference in the outcome. In this round the University did agree to remove that line in Appendix A and we agreed that if, for example, a Dean is a member of the University bargaining team and his or her term finished during the round, he or she can remain on their bargaining team until bargaining ends.
- There were also a number of general housekeeping issues raised by each party, often the same issue raised by both parties. Those were agreed to without difficulty. Most of the issues were minor technical changes.
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Transparency and the University
Posted on Thursday, February 19, 2015 at 12:00 pm
categories: transparency, representational rights, policy development
On Friday, January 30, 2015 the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the fifth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute.
The Association had two proposals dealing, in one way or another, with transparency. The first (UBCFA Proposal #21) sought assurance that members would have the right to representation during investigation processes. Investigations currently can be far from transparent, with members sometimes not even knowing when they are under investigation, sometimes being told that meetings are off the record, and being discouraged from seeking representation by the Association. Often the reason given to members for this behaviour is that involving the Association would complicate matters. The University has, on occasion, called members into meetings with Heads and/or Deans to discuss performance-related issues, and then offered a termination agreement without allowing the individual to consult with the Association.
The Association wants to ensure that members have meaningful protection throughout any investigation they may face. This would include pre-investigation notice and disclosure.
Most of the other unionized employee groups at UBC have these rights, as do Faculty Associations at many of our comparator institutions nationally. In the past the University has always insisted that the Association does not have representational rights in the Collective Agreement and it is therefore not legally bound to contact the Association, or advise members of their right to assistance and representation by the Faculty Association when they are under investigation.
In negotiating this particular proposal, we didn’t get everything we wanted, but we did get the University to agree that when it requires members to attend a meeting where it is known in advance by the University that it may result in discipline, the University must inform the faculty member in advance of his/her right to advice and representation from the Faculty Association and, importantly, that the Faculty Association must be notified. It’s a start.
Our second issue on transparency pertained to various university policy development committees on which our members were being asked to serve. Obviously we encourage our members to fullfil their governance responsibilities. However sometimes policy development committees can veer into areas that touch on the terms and conditions of employment and we wanted to make sure that the University understood that individual members on such committees cannot be seen to speak for the entire membership. Our proposal (UBCFA Proposal #22) was to require formal UBCFA representation on policy development committees. The University pointed out that this was impractical, and we accepted that point. Instead we asked for and received a letter from Lisa Castle, Vice President of Human Resources, which confirms the University’s understanding that faculty members on these committees do not speak for the Faculty Association and their views do not imply agreement by the Association. As that letter adequately dealt with our concerns, we dropped our proposal.Next up on the blog: Other Bargaining issues
Equity and the Evaluation of Scholarship
Posted on Tuesday, February 17, 2015 at 12:00 pm
On Friday, January 30, 2015 the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the fourth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute.
In 2012, the Bargaining Committee asked the UBCFA Status of Women’s Committee for recommendations on ways the Collective Agreement could improve the University’s treatment of members of “designated groups” (i.e. groups with personal attributes that the law generally forbids as grounds for discrimination.) They made recommendations in two areas. First, that Part I of the Collective Agreement should be modified to commit the University to:
- maintain a community that recognizes and values the inherent worth and dignity of every person; fosters tolerance, sensitivity, understanding, and mutual respect among its members; and encourage each individual to strive to reach her or his own potential;
- ensure that there are no barriers or systemic discrimination preventing full participation of all faculty members;
- agree that there shall be no discrimination, interference, restriction or coercion exercised or practiced with respect to any matter included in the Agreement by reason of any personal attributes that the law generally forbids as grounds for discrimination, such as sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, age, etc.; and
- eliminate those employment policies, practices, and systems, whether formal or informal, shown to have an unfavorable effect on the hiring, retention, leadership assumption, and promotion of members of designated groups.
The University made it clear that it was not interested in having such provisions in the Collective Agreement. It was so clear that we didn’t even bring a similar proposal to the table in this round.
The second recommendation of the Status of Women’s Committee was to modify Part 4, Article 4.03 to ensure that, when assessing scholarship for career decisions, recognition is given to different and diverse experiences of marginalized groups and to affirm that diverse substantive contributions to knowledge must be welcomed in the university. The University had no interest in that proposal either in 2012, but we felt strongly about this proposal. We brought it back to the table (UBCFA proposal #23) in this round and we were able to achieve agreement to make the necessary modifications to the Collective Agreement. We think this will make a significant improvement to how members who engage in non-traditional research will be evaluated.Next up on the blog: Transparency and the University
Procedures for Appointment, Reappointment, Tenure and Promotion
Posted on Thursday, February 12, 2015 at 10:00 am
categories: appointment, reappointment, tenure, promotion, appeal
On Friday, January 30, 2015 the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the third in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute.
Article 5 in Part 4 of the Collective Agreement, concerning procedures for appointment, reappointment, tenure and promotion, requires that all departmental recommendations are to be made by standing committees of eligible members. However the members eligible to serve on these standing committees, and the procedures used, depend on which type of recommendation is being made. In particular, in the case of initial appointments the committee comprises those of a rank “equal to or higher than the rank at which the appointment is to be made” (Article 5.04(b)(i)). This seemed unnecessarily complicated to us and we heard from members that many departments were informally consulting all tenure-stream members on initial appointments. We proposed (UBCFA proposal # 17) to amend the Collective Agreement to ensure all tenure stream faculty are consulted in initial appointments. The parties have agreed to amend Article 5.04(b)(i) so that in the case of initial appointments the committee will now comprise all tenured and tenure-track members of the department. This reflects our view that initial appointments should be collegially determined.
Article 9 in the Collective Agreement concerns periodic review for promotion. Members are entitled to periodic reviews and if they choose can require that their file go through the entire process of departmental recommendation, decanal recommendation, SAC recommendation, Presidential decision and, if necessary, appeal of the decision. A negative recommendation at any stage cannot prevent the file from going through to the President. On the other hand a non-periodic review may be stopped by the Head (9.01(d)) or the Dean (5.11(a)). We had two issues. First, the agreement says that a review that proceeds past the stage of the Head requesting external letters of reference shall be deemed to be a periodic review for the purposes of timing the next review (9.01(g)). That seemed unfair to us. We believed that if the Head or the Dean stops the review, either before or after requesting external references, it should not affect the timing of the next periodic review, since a review of the candidate was not, in any meaningful way, carried out. Second, Article 13.01 can be read to mean that if a non-periodic review goes all the way to the President, and he or she makes a negative decision, the member cannot appeal. This too seemed unfair to us. Our proposal #19 addressed both these issues. UBC has agreed to changes so that if a no periodic review is stopped by the Head or the Dean it will not be considered a periodic review for the purposes of timing and that if it goes all the way to the President and he or she makes a negative decision, the decision can be appealed.
Finally, we have an issue with the so-called “terminal year”. Following a decision not to grant a tenured appointment on the expiry of the tenure clock the member is given a one year terminal appointment (2.03(g)). This affords the member the time to wind down their labs and deal with their graduate students if necessary, and to search for employment elsewhere. It also provides time for the Association to grieve the decision. Very occasionally the grievance is still unresolved at the end of the terminal year and it had been the practice in the past to extend the terminal year until the grievance was resolved. In 2012 the University informed us that they no longer intended to extend the terminal year in these circumstances.
The problem with the University suggesting this approach is that winning an appeal against a tenure denial is cold comfort to someone who has had to leave the university and relocate. The Association proposed to amend the Agreement so that when a member is denied tenure, and the grievance is not resolved within the terminal year, the member’s appointment is extended (UBCFA proposal #20). The university would not agree to amend the Collective Agreement in this way, but they did agree that, for the term of the renewal Collective Agreement, where the President’s decision not to grant tenure is grieved, and the grievance process extends beyond the terminal year, the member’s appointment will be extended at least until the end of the academic term in which the settlement occurs, or the arbitration decision is rendered, if dates for the arbitration have been confirmed by the selected arbitrator prior to the end of the terminal year and UBCFA is moving the grievance efficiently towards resolution. This is not ideal, but we accepted it and dropped our proposal to incorporate such language in the Collective Agreement.Next up on the blog: Equity
Maternity, Parental or Adoptive Leave and Tenure Clock Extension
Posted on Tuesday, February 10, 2015 at 10:00 am
categories: maternity leave, parental leave, tenure clock extensions
On Friday, January 30, 2015 the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the second in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute.
Currently, under Part 3, Article 1.03 of the Collective Agreement, when a pre-tenured member takes a maternity, parental or adoptive leave their pre-tenure appointment is extended by one year (thus extending the “tenure clock”). In the 2012-2014 bargaining round UBC made a proposal that if the leaves were less than 15 weeks in length there would be no extension of the tenure clock, but if they took a leave of 15 or more weeks there would be a one year extension. That proposal made no sense to us then, and we did not accept it. In this round the University made exactly the same proposal (UBC proposal #7). Again it made no sense to us but this time the University’s bargaining team did a better job of explaining their problem and we were able to identify for them why the specific proposal that they made was problematic for us.
The problem, in a nutshell, is that in our Collective Agreement parental and maternity leaves (Part 3 Article 6) are tied to members applying for, and receiving, Employment Insurance (EI) maternity or parental leave payments. The length of leaves members were taking is thus heavily influenced by the EI eligibility rules. In particular while both parents may apply for EI parental benefits, they have to share them. In total, there are 35 weeks of parental benefits available to eligible parents of a newborn or newly adopted child and the parents decide how to split those benefits up. For example if the biological mother wants to take 25 weeks of parental leave, the other spouse can only take the remaining 10 weeks of benefits. Consequently the length of parental leave taken by a member is heavily determined by household decisions about how to split up the EI benefits. Those decisions are heavily determined by the employment status of the spouse and his or her employer’s provisions for parental leave. The existing provision was highly restrictive in the first place (as a member must apply for some EI to be eligible for the tenure clock extension) and the University’s original proposal would have made things worse. Realistically, the tenure clock extension should be tied to the arrival of a child in the household, not to taking EI benefits.
As a result of our discussions on this matter the Parties agreed to a provision that when an untenured faculty member on a pre-tenure appointment becomes a parent by birth or adoption he or she will be granted an automatic extension of the tenure clock for one year upon request. There’s a little more to it, but that’s the gist. There is no longer a requirement to claim EI to receive the extension.
Next up on the blog: Procedures for Appointment, Reappointment, Tenure and Promotion
Educational Leadership Stream
Posted on Thursday, February 5, 2015 at 2:30 pm
categories: educational leadership stream, professors of teaching, instructors, promotion and tenure
On Friday, January 30, 2015 the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. Please note that any items agreed to at the bargaining table will not be implemented until the interest arbitration is complete. This is the first in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed to and those that are still in dispute.
In the round of negotiations leading to the 2010-2012 Collective Agreement the University made a proposal to transform the Instructor classification into a full three-rank Educational Leadership classification. At the time the instructor classification had no ranks (Senior Instructor was simply the name given to post-probationary instructors, no actual promotion procedures were involved), the classification was regarded (and described in the Agreement) as a “teaching stream,” and several articles in the Collective Agreement implied that Senior Instructors were analogous to a rank below Assistant Professors. The University proposed to change all of that during that round. The Association’s bargaining team was ambivalent about this proposal (to put it mildly). On the one hand, we knew our members in that stream wanted an improved career path. On the other hand, we feared that members in the newly transformed Educational Leadership stream would be treated as low-cost tenured teaching machines in some Faculties, and as educational leaders in others, leading to a two-tier classification. In the end, based on assurances from the University’s bargaining team that members in the Educational Leadership stream would not be “teaching machines” and that members in every rank in the stream would be afforded adequate time to pursue the educational leadership duties necessary for promotion, we agreed to the University’s proposal. It was, in fact, the very last proposal agreed to in that round of bargaining.
Not surprisingly, problems in the transition from the old model of the instructor stream to the new model have subsequently emerged. In this round the Association took two problems to the table. First, because of the way the Collective Agreement was worded, members in the Educational Leadership classification were not eligible for their first sabbatical after the same length of service that other bargaining unit members were. The Association had assumed this inequity was simply an oversight, left over from the old instructor model and in 2012 we had raised this issue as a housekeeping item. We were told in no uncertain term that this was not housekeeping, that the university fully intended to discriminate against members of the Educational Leadership classification in this way. Not surprisingly, the University did not agree to our proposal at that time. In this round we again made that proposal (UBCFA proposal # 12) and in this round the university took a different approach and we were able to agree to changes to the Collective Agreement to remedy this inequity.
The second change the Association sought (UBCFA proposal # 13) was to define educational leadership in the Collective Agreement in the same way that teaching, scholarly activity, and service are defined in the Collective Agreement. The University saw the value of this, and the parties were able to work together to create an appropriate clause in the agreement that defines these duties. In doing so we were aided by the fact that the Senior Appointments Committee had already tackled this problem and we were able to use their document as a starting point for our discussions.
Finally, the University made a proposal (UBC proposal #6b) to redefine "eligible faculty member" for the purposes of determining which rank votes on appointment, reappointment, tenure and promotion decisions. They pointed out that the current language makes much use of phrases like “of equal or higher rank”, and while the order of the ranks is clear within each stream, there is no real meaning to the notion of “equal rank” across streams. With the new Educational Leadership model the three ranks within each of the educational leadership and professorial streams have become untethered from each other, with ranks in one stream neither being above, below, nor equal to ranks in the other stream in any sense.
This leaves a practical problem. Who is eligible to serve on which tenure and promotion committee? The obvious answer is that if the committee is to consider, for example, the promotion of an Instructor to Senior Instructor only Senior Instructors and Professors of Teaching should be eligible, and that if the committee is to consider the promotion of an Assistant Professor to Associate Professor only Associate Professors and Professors should be eligible. Similarly, only Professors of Teaching should be eligible for committees considering promotion to Professor of Teaching and only Professors should be eligible for committees considering promotion to Professor. There are a couple of problems with this solution. First, in many departments there are relatively few members of the Educational Leadership stream, which would mean tenure and promotion committees would be largely comprised of Educational Leadership faculty from other departments in order to achieve the minimum committee size. But more fundamentally, we did not get the sense from our face-to-face meetings with members that this was a solution that would meet wide approval.
Consequently, we decided to punt. We told the University’s bargaining committee that the Association did not have a position on this, and we were not ready to deal with it the Collective Agreement. Instead we agreed on a set of voting rules, which will be in place during the life of this Agreement. The rules are not exactly arbitrary but they don’t imply any discernable relationship between ranks in the two streams. For example, we agreed that Senior Instructors will now vote on reappointment of Assistant Professors, but not on Promotion to Associate Professor. Associate Professors will vote on promotion to Senior Instructor, but not to promotion to Professor of Teaching. Professors of Teaching and Professors will vote on promotion to Professor of Teaching and Professor.On the question of the makeup of the Dean’s Advisory Committees, the problem was less fraught, both on its face and based on our pre-bargaining face-to-face meetings with members. UBC proposed that both Professors and Professors of teaching be eligible to be selected by the Deans or elected by the members to serve on the Dean’s Advisory Committee, and we agreed. Obviously this doesn’t imply any relationship between the ranks, only that those are the highest ranks in their respective streams. This seemed a reasonable solution. Indeed, in many universities the equivalent of the Dean’s Advisory Committee contains members from all ranks and for years Associate Professors have been members of the Dean’s Advisory Committee in the Okanagan as a practical solution to the low numbers of Professors in the Okanagan, even though this would be completely unacceptable on the Vancouver campus.
Next up on the blog: Maternity, Parental and Adoptive Leaves
Bargaining Ends with Some Agreements
Posted on Sunday, February 1, 2015 at 9:00am
categories: bargaining, settlement, arbitration
The first phase of bargaining between UBC and UBCFA has ended. During this phase, the parties attempt to reach a final agreement on all matters, in which case the agreement is then put to the members for a ratification vote. However, if this phase ends with some matters unresolved, then “the matters in dispute shall be submitted to arbitration” (Part I, Article 9.04(b) of the Collective Agreement(see page 8). This phase concluded on Friday, January 30, 2015 when the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. We will be providing more details on the agreements reached in future blog posts.
We have now entered the second phase of the process. Our legal counsel has been instructed to contact the University's legal counsel to finalize the details of the arbitration including, importantly, the dates for the arbitration hearings. We don't expect that the arbitration will take place until the summer, since arbitrators that would be acceptable to both parties are much in demand and already heavily booked. Between now and the beginning of the arbitration hearings the parties can continue to discuss outstanding issues and we fully anticipate we will have further meetings with the university's bargaining team to see if we can settle any of the items in dispute. While it is possible that arbitration could still be avoided, and all outstanding issues resolved, as happened two bargaining rounds ago, this seems unlikely. The parties are far apart on some key issues, including the general wage increase. Again, we will be providing information on the positions of the parties on the unresolved issues in future blog posts.
The bargaining team would like our members to know that this round of bargaining was a much more pleasant and productive experience than the two previous rounds. Both the Association and the University engaged in open, honest dialogue and worked very hard to come to agreement on a number of very important issues. Though we wish more had been resolved, we enter the arbitration phase pleased with what we’ve accomplished, so going to arbitration should not be considered a failure in any way.
Next up on the blog: Educational Leadership Stream
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A Most Peculiar Proposal
Posted on Thursday, June 12, 2014 at 4:22pm
categories: bargaining, salaries
As part of its general wage increase offer the University has made what must be described as a most peculiar proposal. Their proposal is that on May 1, 2016, in addition to the general wage increase they have proposed, our salaries will also be increased by 50% of the amount by which the Economic Forecast Council forecast underestimates real (inflation adjusted) GDP growth in 2014. They also proposed similar forecast error increases on May 1, 2017, May 1, 2018, and May 1, 2019. This will take some explaining.
The Budget Transparency and Accountability Act of July 6, 2000 creates an Economic Forecast Council comprising “at least 10 persons appointed by order of the minister and selected for their knowledge of the economy of British Columbia and their expertise in economic analysis and forecasting.” Initially the Council included both academic and business experts, but after the Liberals came to power they quickly eliminated the academic experts, and the council now consists solely of appointees from banks, private consulting firms, business organizations like the Business Council of BC, and independent non-profit research organizations like the Conference Board of Canada.
In approximately February of each year the BC government brings down its annual budget, which includes forecasts of real GDP growth for that year by members of the Council. In the 2014 BC Budget and Fiscal Plan members of the Council forecast real GDP growth for 2014. Their forecasts ranged from 2.0% to 2.7% growth in real GDP, with a mean forecast of 2.33%. In November 2015 (twenty months after the 2014 budget was passed) Statistics Canada will produce its estimates of actual real GDP in 2014 and it will be possible to evaluate the accuracy of the Council’s forecasts. UBC has proposed that if the Council’s forecast error (Actual minus Mean Forecast) is positive, then in May 2016 (six months after the forecast error is known) our salaries would increase by one half of the forecast error. In other words, they propose to tie our salaries to inaccuracies in the Economic Forecast Council’s forecasts twenty-six months earlier. If the Council’s average forecast is exactly correct we would get no additional salary increase, but if the Council wildly underestimates growth we will be in for a big payday.
The University claimed that the purpose of this peculiar proposal is to share “the benefits of economic growth between employees in the public sector and the Province contingent on growth in BC’s real GDP” This is false. Had the University wanted to tie our salaries to BC’s real GDP growth, they should have proposed increases based on actual GDP growth, or on GDP growth in excess of the long-run average growth rate. Rather than tie our salaries to BC’s real GDP growth, they have actually proposed to tie them to the inaccuracy of the Economic Forecast Council’s forecasts. Now, to be fair, as far as we know the University’s proposal was devised by the Government, and the University believes the Government is willing to fund the proposal. In any case it is the UBC Board of Governors who are responsible for proposals made at the bargaining table and, for better or worse, this is the peculiar proposal they have decided to make.
How accurate has the Council been in the past? Starting in 2003, the first year that academic experts were eliminated from the Council, and ending in 2012, the last year for which Statistics Canada estimates are available, the Council’s estimates have been reasonably accurate (whether they would have been more or less accurate with the continued inclusion of academic experts is unknown). During that 10-year period the mean absolute forecast error was 0.85, which is not bad considering how sensitive BC’s GDP is to unexpected developments in international markets and resource prices. What would have been the effect on our salaries during those 10 years had the University’s current proposal been in place during that time? The average annual increase over those ten years would have been fifteen-one hundredths of one percent (.0015), which can be translated as $150 annually (before tax) for a faculty member making $100,000.
There is, however, no accurate way to assess what effect this specific proposal would really have on our incomes in the future. First, we have no way of knowing whether the future members of the Council, which is appointed by the Government, will be as accurate in forecasting GDP growth as the past members of the Council. Second, we have no way of knowing how the Council’s forecasting ability will be affected by finding its forecasts part of the mechanism by which faculty members are paid and universities are funded.
We have not responded to this proposal. There is very little point in discussing what is in effect a lottery with unknown expected payout until the University makes a proposal on a general wage increase that is sufficient to keep pace with inflation and faculty salaries at comparable institutions. Nonetheless it remains a most peculiar proposal.
Next up on the blog: Bargaining Ends with Some Agreements
UBC Proposes 0% for 2014/2015. The Association Declines.
Posted on Monday, June 9, 2014 at 3:25pm
categories: bargaining, salaries
On June 5 the Faculty Association and UBC exchanged proposals for a general wage increase (GWI). The University has proposed a five-year agreement with a GWI of 0% in 2014/15, 0.9% in 2015/2016, 1.4% in 2016/17, 1.4% in 2017/2018, and 1.5% in 2018/19. The Association has proposed a two-year agreement with a GWI of 3% in 2014/15 and 3%.
The University's proposals are actually a little more complicated than that, with some salary increases partly deferred by 10 months, the "option" of taking smaller GWI in exchange for increased benefits, like increased Professional Development funds, and a bonus based on the forecast errors made by the Economic Forecast Council We will explain this forecast error bonus in a subsequent blog, but if this bonus had been in place over the past two years, your base salary would have been increased by .04% [four one-hundredths of a percent].
In the last round of bargaining, UBC had originally proposed a GWI of 0.4% and 0.8% over two years. In this round they have initially proposed an even smaller GWI over two years (with below-inflation increases in three additional years).
The Association's proposal of 3% and 3% is based on the following considerations. First, under our Collective Agreement an arbitrator must take into account the University's need to preserve a reasonable balance between the salary of members of the bargaining unit and other expenditures. Second, we know from the last arbitration that a settlement of more than 5% per year would disrupt a reasonable balance, but a settlement of 5% over two years certainly does not disrupt a reasonable balance. Third, an arbitrator must consider changes in price and wage inflation in BC and Canada. It is clear that both price and wage inflation has been trending up from last year, so on that basis, a settlement greater than last year's settlement is justified. Finally, an arbitrator must consider salaries and benefits at other Canadian universities of comparable academic quality and size.
Since our settlement last round was not very different from the settlement at other large research universities in Canada, there is no reason to believe that there has been any change in the relationship between our salaries and those at other Canadian universities of comparable academic quality and size. Taking all these considerations into account, a settlement somewhat greater than last year's settlement is justified.
Next up on the blog: A Most Peculiar Proposal
Our Pension Proposals
Posted on Thursday, May 22, 2014 at 10:09am
categories: bargaining, pension, sessionals, post-71 members
Two of our proposals pertain to pensions. First, we propose that the university provide pension plan contribution for all sessional lecturers. Currently the university only pays full compensation (salary plus pension plan contributions) to sessional lecturers with at least 50% workloads. Second, we propose to work out a way for members' full compensation not to be reduced at age 71, which would happen if the university stopped paying the pension plan contributions at that age.
To understand why we feel so strongly about these proposals it is first necessary to understand how our pension plan works.
At UBC faculty do not have a standard pension. What we call a pension, and what is certainly a pension substitute, is actually a defined contribution savings plan, which is really more akin to a locked-in group RRSP plan. Each year the employer puts a certain percentage of our compensation into the savings plan, and we save a certain percentage of our salary in the same plan. The contributions to the plan are tax deferred, as is any income earned in the plan, just like any other registered savings plan. Unlike a traditional pension, which is both a deferred compensation and an insurance instrument, our plan is a forced savings and investment instrument.
In terms of the University's financial obligations it makes no difference whether they put some portion of our compensation into our group savings plan, or pay the equivalent amount to us directly, allowing us to put it into our personal RRSPs. And it makes no difference to the university at all how much we contribute to our group savings plan (currently about 5%). Whether we save 5%, 10%, or nothing at all in the plan in addition to the amount the university puts in directly is completely irrelevant to the university, at least in terms of cost.
This is not to take a position on the question of whether members would be better or worse off if all their compensation was paid directly them, rather than having some of their compensation placed directly into a locked-in savings plan. Nor is it to take a position on the question of whether a traditional pension, like the one at U of T, is better than our plan. There is certainly room for debate on those issues but since we have not proposed any changes in our plan, that debate is moot.
The point we want to make is simply this: the university's contribution to the plan is simply part of our total compensation, and our so-called pension is simply savings. Once that is understood, it is easy to see why this issue is so important to us.
Consider Sessional Lecturer A in the Faculty of Arts, who teaches one 3-credit course in each Winter session term and has been placed at step 1 of the minimum scale. Dr. A earns a salary of $6,264 for each of the two courses, or a total of $12,528. Sessional Lecturer B, similarly placed at step 1 of the minimum scale, who teaches two 3-credit courses in one term and no courses in the other term will also receive $12,528 in salary, but unlike Sessional Lecturer A, will receive $1,090 placed into his or her defined contribution savings plan. This is not just inequitable, but arbitrary. (Sessional Instructor C, who teaches the same two courses in the Faculty of Education would be paid only $3,756 per course but that gross inequity is the subject of a different proposal.)
Now consider the case of a full-time member who earns $100,000 a year in base salary. His or her total compensation is $100,000 plus the university's contribution to the group savings plan, $9,118. Once this member turns 71 the university is no longer allowed, by law, to contribute to either a defined benefit pension plan, or a registered savings plan. If we don't find a way to ensure that the member continues to receive that $9,118 in compensation he or she will have suffered a cut in total compensation, which is not only inequitable, but a blatant example of discrimination on the basis of age. The law does not require that individuals receive less compensation at the age of 71, only that the compensation can no longer be provided through a pension plan or a registered savings plan contribution. The Association has proposed that full compensation be maintained through the simple mechanism of salary in lieu of contribution to the plan. The fact that this hypothetical member will simultaneously be earning salary in lieu of group plan contributions at the same time he or she is drawing on his or her plan savings is completely irrelevant in the same way that drawing on one's private RRSP savings should not be taken as a reason for the University to cut one's compensation.
Next up on the blog: UBC Proposes 0% for 2014/2015. The Association Declines.
An External Analysis of the University's Budget Model
Posted on Wednesday, May 21, 2014 at 9:56am
categories: bargaining, budget, ability to pay
In preparing for the 2012-2014 arbitration, the Faculty Association commissioned a report from Professors Cameron Morrill and Janet Morrill, accounting professors in the Asper School of Business at the University of Manitoba. The Morrills have considerable experience in examining University budgets for Faculty Associations in Canada. While we did not use this report in the actual arbitration, it did help us to understand a variety of issues related to the University’s ability to pay appropriate salaries to faculty members.
Some of the highlights of their report include the following observations:
- UBC has continuously had unrestricted operating surpluses i.e., operating revenues that exceed operating expenses. In the most recent fiscal year [for which data were available, 2012], UBC had the highest operating surplus of the five years covered by our analysis. The $135 million operating surplus in 2011-2012 was equivalent to just over 13% of total UBC salaries for the year. It would be interesting to see how this figure compares to total UBC faculty salaries.
- Despite small reductions in government grants, UBC has a large student base and unrestricted revenues per student that are stable and have increased over the period of our analysis.
- Net assets: unrestricted and operating became negative in 2012 after a 90-million-dollar decrease during the year, but this situation was created by the Administration’s decision to transfer $229 million in unrestricted funds to Capital Assets.
- The recent level of capital asset acquisitions is extremely high and is financed with an unusually high proportion of unrestricted funds. Management’s future commitments to purchase capital assets are minimal. Thus, they can elect to not make as large capital assets purchases from operating funds, or can be forced to make such an election.
- Over the period under study, management has expended large sums to increase their complement of management and professional staff. While we only know the number of staff, our experience from other universities is that these staff are very highly paid and have often had salary increases that far outpace the increases provided to professorial faculty.
- As with many universities, UBC’s budgeted figures for the future tend to be pessimistic and should therefore not be relied upon as a basis for assessing ability to pay.
We encourage you to read the Morrills’ report carefully.
Next up on the blog: Our Pension Proposals
The University's Destructive Budget Model
Posted on Thursday, May 08, 2014 at10:34am
categories: bargaining, budget, ability to pay
By far and away the largest single complaint we received from members while we prepared for bargaining concerned UBC's budget model. Members are justifiably unhappy about a budget model in which the departments and Faculties are not treated as central to the core mission of the University. The comment “I am particularly concerned about the apparent over-allocation of University funds to administrative positions/costs, and a concomitant reduction of funds available to support scholarly activity and investment in hiring faculty” sums up the comments of many, many members. Repeatedly members asked us to attempt to force the University to fund departments properly. Several members pointed out something that, quite frankly had not occurred to us. They noted that because the costs of the equity settlement were downloaded onto departments, those departments that were predominantly women were most badly affected. Clever, that. The University admits it has been systematically discriminating against women faculty but its response has been most damaging to female-dominated departments by not directly funding the equity settlement. We have also heard repeated complaints that the University did not fund the salary settlement for faculty. The Central Administration does not seem to plan its budget around salary settlements, which many faculty members find troubling.
Although this issue does not fit easily into Collective Agreement language, and we have not attempted to do so in this round, the Association is extremely concerned with the destructive effects of the University's budget model. At this stage we strongly urge members, and particularly Heads, not to accept this budget model as appropriate and to push back on the Deans. We also encourage the Deans to push back against central administration. The current approach to budgeting is so wrongheaded and so destructive that it threatens the very integrity of the institution. It is starving those areas of the University that are its fundamental raison d'etre. While the property development side and the other non-academic sides of the University are undoubtedly important, at the end of the day it is the teaching and scholarly activity side that must remain the core business of the University and the budget model must reflect that.
Next up on the blog: An External Analysis of the University's Budget Model
Bargaining Themes: Three Big Issues Emerge
Posted on Tuesday, May 06, 2014 at 12:20pm
categories: bargaining, workload, instructors
When the bargaining preparation committee analysed the input we got from members in face-to-face meetings, from emails, and from the survey, particularly the comments sections of the survey, three major issues emerged, in addition to widespread concern about salaries. Members can see that most of our non-salary proposals deal with these issues in one way or another.
First, we are increasingly observing what can only be described as symptoms of burnout. Members complain of too much to do, with too little time, and too few resources. They report a sense that they have lost the capacity to influence the decisions that affect the quality of their worklife. They report significant concerns about the equity of the reward structure and a sense that the university does not value their contributions. Amongst many members there is a sense that the university's priorities no longer reflect the values that attracted them to academic careers in the first place. These complaints are classic, almost textbook, symptoms of burnout.
Terms like “bullying,” “no consultation,” “unfair,” “inequitable”, and “minimal information” appear repeatedly in the comments. Examples of such comments include:
- “Faculty are more and more burdened with the downloading of administrative duties and not getting much credit for taking it on.”
- “Management treatment of faculty is horrendous.”
- “Toxic work environment.”
- “ More comprehensive language around transparency.”
- “Can the deteriorating work environment be addressed in any way by bargaining?”
- “I believe the largest generation of long-term problems for faculty at UBC is the increasingly disconnected nature of the decision-making progress of upper levels (finance, initiatives like the Vantage program, IT, etc) from the faculty. Decisions are constantly being made with either no consultation with the faculty/staff members who these decisions will impact, or a sham of consultation.”
Second, there is significant dissatisfaction with the status of contract academic staff. Over 25% of our members are contract academics, mostly Sessionals but increasingly Lecturers as well. Salaries, job security, access to benefits, and pension contributions are all inadequate. Comments from Sessionals and Lecturers were scathing of course, but many members in tenure-stream positions also made a point of conveying their dismay about the conditions of contract faculty.
Third, there is a great deal of dissatisfaction among members in the educational leadership stream (Instructor I, Senior Instructor, Professor of Teaching) about the lack of respect the university shows them. Many expressed concerns that their heavy teaching loads would not allow them to complete the educational leadership requirements that are now required for tenure and promotion in that stream. These problems arise from lack of clarity in the Collective Agreement about the role of the educational leadership stream at the University.
We really appreciate the time people took to share their comments with us as we prepared for bargaining. It was very helpful to us in formulating our proposals.
Next up on the blog:The University's Destructive Budget Model
Bargaining Begins for 2014-2016
Posted on Monday, April 4, 2014 at 3:20pm
categories: bargaining, proposals
Negotiations between UBC and UBCFA to renew the Collective Agreement that expires on June 30, 2014 began formally on April 7 - 8, although the parties did engage in some preliminary discussions in the preceding months.
Both parties have presented all of their proposals, with two exceptions. UBC has a proposal on the library they have yet to make and we are still finalizing our list of housekeeping items.
The University has not tabled any specific language and the Association has thus far only tabled specific language on a few issues. At our next meeting, on May 8, it is expected that both parties will table specific language on all proposals with the possible exception of across the board salary increases. The Association will not table a specific proposal on across the board salary increases until the University's bargaining team has been authorized to make a meaningful response.
Until specific language has been tabled, it's not reasonable to attempt to characterize the University's proposals; however, members can read the proposals that the University has tabled thus far here. The Association’s proposals can be found here. Over the next month we will be using this blog to give members more detailed description of the problems we are trying to solve and the objectives we are attempting to achieve, so stay tuned.
Next up on the blog: Bargaining Themes: Three Big Issues Emerge
Bargaining: Preparation for Next Round Begins
Posted on wednesday, january 22, 2014 at 3:15pm
categories: bargaining, arbitration
Although the 2012-2014 Collective Agreement was only finalized in late 2013, it will soon expire, on June 30, 2014. Consequently it is already time to begin preparations for the next round of negotiations, tentatively set to begin in mid-March. Once negotiations begin it is expected that they will proceed fairly intensively until either a new Collective Agreement, or impasse, is reached. Our expectation is that if the University is willing and able to negotiate a Collective Agreement without recourse to an Arbitrator, it will be done by mid-June.
As always, if a new agreement is not reached before the expiration of the current agreement the current agreement will remain in force.
Members will well recall that the last round of negotiations, which started on February 14, 2012, was a very long drawn-out process. This was partly caused by the university’s unwillingness or inability to “put money on the table” until well after the previous agreement had expired and an arbitrator named, and partly caused when the arbitrator contracted an illness at precisely the time he was scheduled to hear our arbitration. We hope that this round can be concluded more expeditiously, preferably without the help of an arbitrator, but to some extent this is outside our control.
Members can expect to receive an invitation to complete a fairly short electronic bargaining survey soon. In addition to the usual set of questions there is space for members to relate any specific concerns or issues they would like to see addressed in this round of negotiations. We would greatly appreciate it if you would take the time to complete it.
If you’d like to be considered for our bargaining preparation committee or our bargaining advisory committee, please send an email to us. We are looking for members who would like to be involved in various aspects of the bargaining process, and would like to make that commitment to the Association.
To avoid email overload, we selectively email blogs to the entire message. Be sure to check back to the blog on a regular interval by bookmarking this webpage. Or, you can subscribe to our blog to get automatic updates.
Next up on the blog: Bargaining Begins for 2014-2016
What the Arbitrator Ruled in Bargaining 2012, and Why
Posted on Monday, November 18, 2013 at 8:45am
categories: Interest arbitration, bargaining, salary increases
On July 25, 2013, the Faculty Association and the University sent out a joint memorandum describing the details of the arbitration award for the years 2012 – 2014. We also linked to the actual award so that members could read it in its entirety. However many members have found the entire award a bit much to internalize and have asked us for a short, non-technical, explanation of the reasoning behind the salary settlement. Here it is.
The first thing Arbitrator Taylor had to adjudicate was the question of how large a salary award the University had the ability to pay, based on maintaining a “reasonable balance” between faculty salaries and other expenditures in the University’s general purpose operating funds. He found that the ratio of faculty salaries to total expenditures, over the seven years between 2006 and 2012, ranged from a low of 24.9% to a high of 28.8%.
The Association took the position that a pay rise of 5% per year would still maintain a reasonable balance and the University took the position that 2% per year was the absolute maximum increase that would maintain a reasonable balance. Arbitrator Taylor accepted neither position. He ruled that the Association’s proposal of general wage increases of 5% and 5% would result in ratios for 2013 and 2014 (forecast) of 28.9% and 31.1%, respectively. In his view, for 2014, the Association’s proposal was outside the reasonable balance and therefore beyond the University’s ability to pay. On the other hand he also ruled that the University did have the ability to pay a salary increase in excess of 2% per year.
The second question on which Arbitrator Taylor had to rule was, within the fairly wide range of salary increases that the University did have the ability to pay, what salary award was most appropriate? In making that decision he primarily considered the need to keep pace with inflation and the general state of salaries at our comparator universities.
The Association had argued that higher wages were also needed for the purpose of recruitment and retention. However on that point Arbitrator Taylor said “I accept the University’s submissions that it does not have a general recruitment and retention problem.”
The University had argued that our progress through the ranks (CPI, Merit and PSA) and annual bonus represented something analogous to an annual pay increase. On this point Arbitrator Taylor said: “I also accept the Association’s submission that PTR rewards individuals’ career advancement; it is not a substitute for a general wage increase to keep pace with inflation and the general state of salaries elsewhere.”
In terms of the criteria on which his award was primarily based, inflation and the general state of salaries elsewhere, he ruled that a) monthly price inflation was fairly low, ranging from 1.25% to 2.33% between January 2011 and July 2012; b) monthly wage inflation was somewhat higher, ranging from 1.8% to 3.2% over the same period; and c) salaries at UBC have fallen somewhat behind its relative place in terms of academic quality. Taking these factors into account he ruled:
“The appropriate Award under Article 11.02 [of the Collective Agreement] is therefore annual increases of 2.5% and 2.5%.” and “I am satisfied this falls within the University’s ‘ability to pay’ as defined in that Article.”
The Association was not unhappy with this award even though we would have preferred a larger increase. While a higher awarded increase would still have remained within the University’s ability to pay it was not the Arbitrator's duty to award the largest possible increase that the University can afford, but to make an award that is appropriate given criteria such as inflation and wages at comparable universities. We think he discharged his duties thoughtfully and impartially.
Next up on the blog: Bargaining: Preparation for Next Round Begins