Benefit Cuts for Members Past Age 71
Posted on Wednesday, March 25, 2015 at 10:00 a.m.
categories: Benefits, Total Compensation, Two-Tiered Compensation
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are still a number of issues in still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. This is the eleventh in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute, and the third dealing with matters still in dispute.
Members who continue to work past the age of 71 lose health and welfare benefits provided by the University, as well as the 10 percent equivalent of their salary that the University contributes into the Faculty Pension Plan. These conditions result in a significant drop in the total compensation members receive from the University once they turn 71.
Part 2, Article 7.12 of the Collective Agreement reads: “The following benefit plans available to members under the age of 65 remain in place for members who work past their Normal Retirement Date in accordance with the terms of the plans: Extended Health Plan; Dental Plan; Optional Life Insurance for Members; Medical Services Plan; Employee and Family Assistance Plan; Professional Development Reimbursement Fund; Dependent Benefits Coverage Following Death of a Member.” On its face this looks like a no discrimination clause, but the key, and problematic, phrase is this: “in accordance with the terms of the plans”. The PD Reimbursement Fund and the Dependent Benefits Coverage plan are not at issue, as those “plans” are described in the Collective Agreement, although there was a temporary restriction on PD funds for members over 71, which has since been rectified. The Medical Services plan is employee-paid, so that’s not an issue. The big issue arises with Extended Health and Dental coverage, which UBC has contracted with Sun Life to administer. The plan can be found at hr.ubc.ca/benefits/files/faculty-health-dental-booklet.pdf. One of the features of the plan is that coverage expires at the end of the year in which a member turns 71.
This provision causes serious hardship to members. When members continue to be employed past 71, they must purchase the more restrictive post-retirement plan (see Retirement and Survivor Benefits for additional information) or private insurance.* Whether they purchase insurance through RSB or privately, their costs would be higher and benefits lower than would be the case for their younger colleagues. Further, many post-71 members continue to travel as part of their professional duties and yet they don’t have any University-paid insurance should they suffer an accident or injury while performing their duties as faculty members.
The Association has proposed changing the benefits provision so that all members would continue to be eligible until they retired from the University. This is such a low cost item, but UBC has been clear and unequivocal in its position. It’s not about the cost, but about wanting to discourage faculty from continuing to work beyond the age of 71. While the University acknowledged during bargaining that the issue of faculty members travelling on University business without insurance might be something to be addressed, no such proposal was forthcoming.
The second post-71 issue regards the Faculty Pension Plan (FPP). Currently the University reduces total compensation paid to members once they turn 71 by discontinuing contributions to the Faculty Pension Plan, with the explanation that CRA rules require that individuals begin to draw on their pension no later than December 1 of the year in which they turn 71, and no more contributions can be made to the plan. While true, the University has not made any arrangement to continue to pay that portion of total compensation that previously was paid as pension contribution. To get a more fulsome description of this issue, read "Our Pension Proposal". Our proposal is to reach agreement on a mechanism to maintain the same total compensation after age 70 as before age 70 because we do not support members receiving different compensation on the basis of age.
This is an important issue for us and we expect the University to work with us to develop a mechanism for maintaining the 10% salary equivalent, albeit in a plan outside of the FPP.
The University saves very little (approximately fourteen one-hundredths of one percent of their total salary bill) by reducing the total compensation of members over 71 through the elimination of extended health and dental plans, and pension contributions. If the University does not agree to our proposal to maintain the total compensation of all members, we will investigate the issue further to ensure that our members are not being discriminated against on the basis of their age.
* (March 25, 2015, 1:20 pm) An earlier version of this blog incorrectly stated that post-71 employees are not eligible to purchase retirement benefits. This was based on information on a UBC webpage, which turned out to be incomplete. We have since discovered that post-71 members are also entitled to join the RSB.
Next up on the blog: Sessional Issues
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General Wage Increase (GWI) Proposal Explained
Posted on Wednesday, March 18, 2015 at 9:00 a.m.
categories: Salaries, Salary Increases, Inflation
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are a number of issues still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. This is the tenth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute, and the second dealing with matters still in dispute.
The purpose of the general wage increase (GWI), as Arbitrator Taylor put it, is “to keep pace with inflation and the general state of salaries elsewhere.” [2013 arbitration decision, UBC vs UBCFA, paragraph 111, page 51]. The Collective Agreement Part 1, Article 11.02eii)actually refers to two different price inflation rates: changes in the Vancouver and Canadian Consumer Price Indices. However for purposes of analysis and prediction it is sufficient to look only at a single index. We explain our proposed general increase below.
All Consumer Price Indices tend to move together, and any deviations in rates of change are inherently short term and unpredictable. This point is illustrated by comparing the Canadian, BC, and Vancouver inflation rates over the past 35 years or so, in Figure 1. The horizontal black line is set at 2%.
Source: Statistics Canada. Table 326-0020 - Consumer Price Index (CPI), 2011 basket, monthly (2002=100), CANSIM (database). (accessed: 2015-02-08)
The inflation rate in Canada, and in every province and city in Canada, is a product of the Bank of Canada’s monetary policy, which in turn is determined by the Bank of Canada’s inflation target rate. Since 1991 the target range has been 1 to 3 per cent, with the Bank's monetary policy aimed at keeping inflation at the 2 per cent target midpoint. The inflation-control target was adopted in 1991 and most recently has been renewed to the end of 2016. Figure 1 demonstrates how effective the Bank’s targeting policy has been in achieving its 2% target.
While short term deviations do occur, they are largely unpredictable, but the Association’s view is that, while forecasting inflation rates over the next few years, the only reasonable prediction is that inflation, in all jurisdictions, will average 2% per year.
The general state of salaries elsewhere
In terms of “the general state of salaries elsewhere” the Collective Agreement (Part 1, Article 11.02eiii-iv) actually provides two comparators. The first is “changes in British Columbian and Canadian Average Salaries and Wages.” This acknowledges that our wage increases should keep pace with wage inflation generally. The second is “wages and benefits” at comparable universities. This acknowledges that our wage increases should keep pace with wage increases generally, but also particularly with wages at other universities.
Wage Inflation, measured by increases in average weekly wages, tends to be higher than price inflation, measured by changes in the Consumer Price Index. Over the past ten years, on average wage inflation in BC and in Canada have been 1.2 percentage points and 1.0 percentage points higher, respectively, than the corresponding price inflation rates. (E.g.; while Canada’s price inflation averaged 1.8% over the past 10 years, Canada’s wage inflation averaged 2.8%.)
It is hard to quantify how much our wages are below the level that would be appropriate for a university of our size and quality. The position of the Association is that our wages should be comparable to those at the University of Toronto. UBC, by pretty much every measure, is ranked second only to the U of T in Canada in terms of international recognition. By contrast, our wage levels are not second highest in the country and our relative position seems to have been slipping in recent years.
The Collective Agreement provides no guidance on how price, general wage inflation, and wages at comparable universities should be weighted, but the implication of the Agreement seems to be that an appropriate wage increase would be somewhere in the middle of these three measures.
Real salaries are salaries measured by how much actual purchasing power is provided by nominal salaries. Since prices tend to rise by an average of 2% per year (approximately 0.165% per month), once your monthly salary is determined on July 1 of any year the spending power of that salary will start to decline every month until, by June 31 of the following year, your command over goods and services has declined by 2%. If our Collective Agreement had a cost of living adjustment (COLA), salaries would automatically increase each July 1 to compensate for the inflation of the past year. Instead, our actual real wages have exhibited quite a different pattern with GWI sometimes being less than inflation, sometimes for many years in a row, and occasionally settlements being greater than inflation, allowing for “catch-up.” Unfortunately, catch-up is hard to achieve, especially in arbitration.
To visualize the effects of inflation on salaries, we calculated the trajectory of a salary corresponding to a nominal salary of $5,316 per month in June of 1980. After over 20 years of annual GWI (which ranged from 0% to 18% over that period) that nominal salary would have grown to $10,000 per month by June 2002 and $12,545 by June of 2014. By correcting the nominal salary for the value of the Canadian Consumer Price Index (set at 100 in June 2002) we convert the nominal salaries into real salaries. Figure 2 illustrates the actual trajectory of real salaries.
It is obvious that the historic relationship between inflation and GWI can be described as having four phases. The first phase occurs during the high inflation period of the early 1980s when GWI fell far short of inflation. The second phase occurs during the late 1980s and early 1990s when lower inflation, coupled with reasonable GWI held real salary approximately constant. The third phase was the gradual loss of real income in the late 1990s, as a result of six consecutive years of very low GWI. Only the last phase (what we think of as the modern era that starts with UBCFA unionizing in 2000) demonstrates the pattern you would expect, with periods of below inflation GWI being followed by periods of above inflation GWI. Figure 2 also illustrates why it is so important not to allow prolonged periods of below inflation GWI – we will probably never be able to catch up.
To further illustrate this point, in Figure 3 we focus in on the last 7 years and consider the difference between the real salaries we experienced after the arbitration award and the real salaries we would have experienced had we accepted UBC’s salary proposal in the last round. Had we accepted UBC’s salary offer the real salary in this example would be almost $100 per month less than it would be under the actual salary settlement. While this may not appear to be a large loss, it compounds over one’s career, and experience has taught us that it is very difficult to make up these losses subsequently.
GWI Proposals in the Current Round
Currently the Association and the University are at an impasse on the matter of GWI. The Association’s position is for a GWI of 3% on each of July 1, 2014 and July 1, 2015. We propose a two year deal. Keep in mind that the purpose of GWI is to keep pace with inflation and the general state of salaries at other comparable universities. The Association contends, and Arbitrator Taylor agreed, that salaries at UBC have fallen somewhat behind its relative place in terms of academic quality [2013 arbitration decision, UBC vs UBCFA, paragraph 104, page 49]. Given an expected inflation rate of 2% per year, general wage inflation at 3% per year, and the need for our salary levels to be more commensurate with those at comparator universities, we believe a settlement of 3% and 3% is reasonable.
The University is proposing a 5 year agreement as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. University's Proposed Salary Increases*
|July 1, 2014||0.0%|
|July 1, 2015||0.9%|
|July 1, 2016||0.4%|
|May 1, 2017||1.0%|
|July 1, 2017||0.4%|
|May 1, 2018||1.0%|
|July 1, 2018||0.5%|
|May 1, 2019||1.0%|
*the University proposed three slightly different alternatives. This illustrates their alternative 1.
The University’s proposal works out to a little over 1% per year over a five year period where we can expect inflation of 2% a year. In other words the University has proposed a deliberate and prolonged diminution of real salaries!
To illustrate the difference between the Association’s and the University’s proposals, Figure 4 has projected out real salaries (assuming 2% inflation) generated by each. Under the Faculty Association’s proposal real salaries should rise, by June 2016, to the level last seen in early 2010. Under the University’s proposal real salaries will fall to a level below our historic low of June 2008.
The last round of bargaining occurred during a period of unusually low price inflation in British Columbia, in part because of the HST debacle. In his 2013 Award Arbitrator Taylor found that “the factor of [price inflation] would tend to support an annual increase of 1.5%.” He made this ruling before inflation rates in 2013-14 became known. Inflation did rebound considerably in the second year and his overall estimate was a bit low, but reasonable under the circumstances. He further ruled that wage inflation would “tend to support an annual increase of 2.5%.” His estimate that wage inflation would run 1% higher than price inflation was exactly correct in our view. Arbitrator Taylor then argued that taking price inflation and wage inflation together, these two factors would tend to support an annual increase of 2.0%. However taking into account salaries and benefits at other Canadian universities of comparable academic quality and size brought his final award to 2.5% each year for two years [2013 arbitration decision, UBC vs UBCFA, paragraph 121, pages 54-55].
In our estimation, a price inflation estimate of 2% and a wage inflation estimate of 3% in the current round is appropriate. Given that, and given our need to recapture lost ground against other universities, an overall GWI of 3% is called for this year.
Next up on the blog: Benefits for members past age 71
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UPDATE: University Proposes to Implement PTR Increases
Posted on Friday, March 13, 2015 at 2:00 pm
categories: Salary, Career Advancement
In our bargaining blog this week, we discussed our proposal to remove the contract-specific dates on which PTR increases (CPI, Merit, and PSA) are implemented so that faculty members would receive anticipated annual salary increases even when we have not finished negotiating the next collective agreement. While the University has not agreed to this proposal, President Gupta has assured the Faculty Association that interest accrued on our delayed salary increases has nothing to do with the University’s position on this issue. We accept unequivocally his assurances.
It turns out that when President Gupta learned that the arbitration on our collective agreement would not take place until late October, he had initiated the processes necessary to present to the Faculty Association a proposal to implement PTR increases before the arbitration without prejudice to either parties’ positions in bargaining. There are many technical steps in making this proposal, and our bargaining blog was published before the Administration had an opportunity to communicate this proposal to the Faculty Association.
We are pleased to share the good news that the University is proposing to the Faculty Association that the University implement CPI, Merit, and PSA increases for faculty members for 2014 before the arbitration. Naturally, the Faculty Association has agreed to this.
The University and the Faculty Association will release a joint communication shortly to all members eligible for PTR.
Next up on the blog: General Wage Increase (GWI) Proposal Explained
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Progress Through the Ranks (PTR)
Posted on Wednesday, March 11, 2015 at 10:00 am
categories: Salary, Career Advancement
While the parties have agreed on many issues there are still a number of issues in still in dispute. On some of these issues the parties are likely to engage in further discussion that might lead to resolution, others will have to be decided by an Arbitrator. This is the ninth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute, and the first dealing with matters still in dispute.
Salary increases to individual members fall into two categories: General Wage Increases (GWI), and Progress Through the Ranks (PTR). GWIs are intended to protect members against inflation and maintain salary comparability with faculty at other universities of comparable academic quality and size. PTR is intended to reward individuals’ career advancement. The provisions of Progress Through the Ranks are contained in Part 2, Sections 2.02 through 2.05 of the Collective Agreement.
PTR ensures that members of the bargaining unit receive salary adjustments to recognize the increased contribution to the University over time that comes from years of experience and career progress. Thus, PTR is distinct from any general increases for inflationary purposes.
Our PTR system (sometimes called the Career Advancement Plan) is similar to that at many other universities. The value of the PTR “pool” is determined as 2.5% of the total salary of eligible members (1.25% for Career Progress Increments, 0.75% for Merit, and 0.5% for PSA). While not the highest in Canada, the percentage value, at 2.5%, is pretty typical.
We are trying to solve three main problems with our PTR proposals. First, the existing language pertaining to the PTR plan contains specific dates for the distribution of this money to faculty members. The 2012-2014 Collective Agreement specifies that the 2.5% be allocated on July 1, 2012 and July 1, 2013. Normally what would happen is that the 2014-2016 Collective Agreement would specify new dates: July 1, 2014 and July 1, 2015. However since negotiations to renew the Collective Agreement weren’t completed by July 1, 2014 those payments have been delayed. This happens every bargaining round and is always a source of considerable irritation by the members. We have proposed, again, to replace the specific dates with the phrase “July 1 of each year” in which case the PTR increases could be paid out even after the Agreement expires and negotiations are still ongoing. At almost every other comparator university in Canada, and in every other bargaining unit at UBC, increments are paid annually on a specific date, notwithstanding the fact that the Collective Agreement has expired. Real mischief is done to our members by the current state of affairs. Since UBC withholds the PTR increases until the end of bargaining (and the several months afterwards it takes payroll to reprogram the system) implicit interest on salaries (and actual interest on pensions) is being denied to members (it doesn’t disappear, UBC keeps the interest for itself).
UBC has remained consistently resistant to accepting our proposal, even though it would simplify things both for the University and for the members. It is hard to understand UBC’s resistance to this very sensible proposal (unless it’s just about them keeping the interest). To date the University has made no suggestion to us that it is willing to pay out PTR in advance of the completion of arbitration. If they wish to pay out the PTR we will certainly facilitate it, as we have in the past. However the University’s current position does mean that the earliest you will see the July 2014 increases is likely to be in Spring of 2016, which further supports speculation about the interest.
Our second problem has to do, not with the 2.5% overall pool of PTR nor the division into 1.25% for Career Progress Increments, 0.75% for Merit, and 0.5% for PSA (neither party has proposed any changes to this). It has to do with the way the actual dollar value of a CPI increment (and thus of a Merit unit) is calculated. Currently the university calculates the size of the CPI pool, then estimates how many CPI units are to be awarded, divides the former by the latter, and derives the value of an individual CPI unit. Consequently the values of CPI units are partly determined by how many increments are due in any given year, and this is subject to significant random variation. As a result the value of a CPI unit, rather than rising smoothly in concert with the GWI, rises erratically. For example between 2012/13 and 2013/14 the value of a CPI unit rose by 3.2%, while GWI was 2.45% but between 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 the value of a CPI unit rose by almost 8% while GWI was 0%. This produces some salary compression, and some random variations in career earnings. For example, an Assistant Professor hired in 2009 would have received, in CPI alone, 20.8% more during his or her first two years than somebody hired just four years previously would have earned in CPI in his or her first two years. These differentials obviously compound over time. Our proposal is to have the CPI value rise with inflation rather than be determined residually. This makes good sense, and we worked out a way to ensure that the size of the total CPI pool would not be affected, so there is no cost implication to the University. The University rejected this proposal.
Our third proposal is to allow merit to be awarded in ½ unit amounts. Currently it can only be awarded in 1, 1½, 2, 2½, and 3 unit amounts. This will be particularly helpful for members in cross-appointments and also provides more flexibility when members are equally meritorious, but the merit pool is not large enough to reward all meritorious members.
In the 2012 round of bargaining, we made essentially the same proposals with respect to the dates, the CPI value, and the ½ merit unit, and failing agreement, took the proposals to Arbitration. The university argued that none of our proposals should be awarded, and the Arbitrator agreed. Obviously we intend to redouble our efforts to convince the Arbitrator of the value of our proposals this time.
It may be possible for the parties to reach agreement on these proposals before Arbitration begins. A number of proposals, counter proposals and counter-counter proposals were exchanged on this matter in an attempt to reach an agreement, but as yet no agreement has been reached, and our discussions at the table are without prejudice to the parties’ positions at Arbitration.
Next up on the blog: University Proposes to Implement PTR Increases
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Article 17: Preservation of Past Rights and Practices
Posted on Thursday, March 5, 2015 at 10:00 am
categories: article 17, consultation
On Friday, January 30, 2015 the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. This is the eighth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute.
As long as anybody on the bargaining team can remember, UBC has been proposing to eliminate or suspend Article 17 in Part 1 of the Collective Agreement. Article 17 is entitled “Preservation of Past Rights and Practices” and it reads, in its entirety, “Subject to this Agreement or any amendments thereto or to any Collective Agreement the University agrees not to change rights of or practices relating to Faculty Members or members of the bargaining unit that traditionally have been the subject of consultation and discussion without appropriate consultation and discussion at the Departmental, Faculty or University level.”
This article is obviously very important to the Association as it is the University’s obligation to abide by the longstanding traditions of shared academic governance in the academy and not to make unilateral changes to matters that have traditionally been the subject of consultation. We have never really understood why the University brings this proposal back each year. The University has always responded that it wants to be able to discuss an issue with us (i.e. the Union) without committing itself to future consultations. This never made any sense to us. First, the article clearly encompasses more than discussions with the Faculty Association. Why get rid of the consultation at the Departmental, Faculty or University level if the problem is consultation at the Faculty Association level? Second, UBCFA is always entitled to make any proposal pertaining to the working conditions of its members at the bargaining table and the University is obliged to negotiate these matters in good faith. If we want to talk about something, we can always bring it to the table (admittedly only during bargaining rounds, not during the period of the Collective Agreement.)
Nonetheless, the matter was clearly very important to the University and, in the spirit of attempting to come to an agreement with the University, the Association agreed, not to eliminate or change the existing article, but to add a second paragraph making it clear that, for the period of the Collective Agreement, the University can discuss matters with the Association without obligating themselves to further consultation. We hope this added paragraph will indeed lead to even greater consultation between the Parties about matters that affect the employment conditions of our members.
Next up on the blog: TBD
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President’s Right to Consult re: Tenure and Promotion
Posted on Tuesday, March 3, 2015 at 10:00 am
categories: tenure, promotion
On Friday, January 30, 2015 the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. This is the seventh in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute.
The University proposed (UBC Proposal #6c) that the President should have the right to consult with the Provosts or Deputy Vice Chancellor regarding tenure and/or promotion decisions. (To explain, members should know that UBC has two different positions called “Provost”, one for each campus, and one position called “Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Principal” in the Okanagan).
The Faculty Association questioned why the President needed to consult yet more people for promotion and tenure decisions. There are already a large number of steps in the tenure and promotion processes. The department makes a recommendation, the Head makes a separate recommendation, the Dean makes a recommendation, SAC makes a recommendation, and after all that the President can request a further review by the Dean. How much can the Provosts or DVC add at this stage? The University explained that the President might need a “sounding board.”
The Association wasn't really convinced this was necessary, but in the end we did agree to allow this, provided that these were the only other people the President would consult, and provided that if the Provosts or Deputy Vice Chancellor raise serious concerns about the candidacy or any new negative information or serious concerns were introduced during the consultation, the candidate would be informed and given an opportunity to respond in writing.
Next up on the blog: Article 17: Preservation of Past Rights and Practices
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Titles and Ranks, Appendix A and Other Issues
Posted on Wednesday, February 25, 2015 at 10:00 am
categories: ranks, Appendix A, housekeeping
On Friday, January 30, 2015 the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. This is the sixth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute.
Inevitably over the period in which a Collective Agreement is in force, either the Association or the University finds minor, technical matters that need addressing. This blog outlines some of those issues.
- The Ranks and Titles section of the Agreement (Part 4, Article 5) has a strange array of ranks. The seven described ranks are: Instructor I, Instructor II, Senior Instructor, Professor of Teaching, Assistant Professor, Associate Professor, Professor. The uninformed reader might conclude that the first four ranks comprised the Educational Leadership stream and the last three comprised the Professorial stream. Not so. Instructor I does not, as you might expect, lead to Instructor II. Instructor II in fact is a rank in the Professorial stream reserved for those who might otherwise be hired as Assistant Professors, but who, at the date of hire, have not yet completed their terminal degree. This rank needed to be renamed for clarity. The parties agreed to rename Instructor I as Instructor, and to rename Instructor II as Acting Assistant Professor.
- Appendix A in Part I lists all of the academic employees who for one reason or another (normally because they hold management positions) are excluded from the bargaining unit. During their time out of the bargaining unit, these individuals no longer have the rights and protections of the Collective Agreement, so this is a list with important implications. Many will remember the dust up in the 2010 round when the University tried to take both Associate Deans and Heads out of the bargaining unit. We agreed on the proposal with respect to Associate Deans, based on the University’s assertion that Associate Deans hold management positions, but we held firm on Heads, who clearly do not.
Appendix A also included “Faculty members appointed to the University’s Negotiating Committee.” The notion that the University could pluck faculty members out of the bargaining unit, have them potentially work against the interests of their colleagues, and then dump them back into the bargaining unit is so absurd we assumed the language was left over from the days before UBCFA became a union. In the 2010 and 2012 rounds, the University refused to change this language. During the 2010 round we had some mediation, and the mediator confessed to our team that the Labour Board would not support the University’s position on this. Not that this made any difference in the outcome. In this round the University did agree to remove that line in Appendix A and we agreed that if, for example, a Dean is a member of the University bargaining team and his or her term finished during the round, he or she can remain on their bargaining team until bargaining ends.
- There were also a number of general housekeeping issues raised by each party, often the same issue raised by both parties. Those were agreed to without difficulty. Most of the issues were minor technical changes.
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Transparency and the University
Posted on Thursday, February 19, 2015 at 12:00 pm
categories: transparency, representational rights, policy development
On Friday, January 30, 2015 the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. This is the fifth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute.
The Association had two proposals dealing, in one way or another, with transparency. The first (UBCFA Proposal #21) sought assurance that members would have the right to representation during investigation processes. Investigations currently can be far from transparent, with members sometimes not even knowing when they are under investigation, sometimes being told that meetings are off the record, and being discouraged from seeking representation by the Association. Often the reason given to members for this behaviour is that involving the Association would complicate matters. The University has, on occasion, called members into meetings with Heads and/or Deans to discuss performance-related issues, and then offered a termination agreement without allowing the individual to consult with the Association.
The Association wants to ensure that members have meaningful protection throughout any investigation they may face. This would include pre-investigation notice and disclosure.
Most of the other unionized employee groups at UBC have these rights, as do Faculty Associations at many of our comparator institutions nationally. In the past the University has always insisted that the Association does not have representational rights in the Collective Agreement and it is therefore not legally bound to contact the Association, or advise members of their right to assistance and representation by the Faculty Association when they are under investigation.
In negotiating this particular proposal, we didn’t get everything we wanted, but we did get the University to agree that when it requires members to attend a meeting where it is known in advance by the University that it may result in discipline, the University must inform the faculty member in advance of his/her right to advice and representation from the Faculty Association and, importantly, that the Faculty Association must be notified. It’s a start.
Our second issue on transparency pertained to various university policy development committees on which our members were being asked to serve. Obviously we encourage our members to fullfil their governance responsibilities. However sometimes policy development committees can veer into areas that touch on the terms and conditions of employment and we wanted to make sure that the University understood that individual members on such committees cannot be seen to speak for the entire membership. Our proposal (UBCFA Proposal #22) was to require formal UBCFA representation on policy development committees. The University pointed out that this was impractical, and we accepted that point. Instead we asked for and received a letter from Lisa Castle, Vice President of Human Resources, which confirms the University’s understanding that faculty members on these committees do not speak for the Faculty Association and their views do not imply agreement by the Association. As that letter adequately dealt with our concerns, we dropped our proposal.Next up on the blog: Other Bargaining issues
Equity and the Evaluation of Scholarship
Posted on Tuesday, February 17, 2015 at 12:00 pm
On Friday, January 30, 2015 the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. This is the fourth in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute.
In 2012, the Bargaining Committee asked the UBCFA Status of Women’s Committee for recommendations on ways the Collective Agreement could improve the University’s treatment of members of “designated groups” (i.e. groups with personal attributes that the law generally forbids as grounds for discrimination.) They made recommendations in two areas. First, that Part I of the Collective Agreement should be modified to commit the University to:
- maintain a community that recognizes and values the inherent worth and dignity of every person; fosters tolerance, sensitivity, understanding, and mutual respect among its members; and encourage each individual to strive to reach her or his own potential;
- ensure that there are no barriers or systemic discrimination preventing full participation of all faculty members;
- agree that there shall be no discrimination, interference, restriction or coercion exercised or practiced with respect to any matter included in the Agreement by reason of any personal attributes that the law generally forbids as grounds for discrimination, such as sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, age, etc.; and
- eliminate those employment policies, practices, and systems, whether formal or informal, shown to have an unfavorable effect on the hiring, retention, leadership assumption, and promotion of members of designated groups.
The University made it clear that it was not interested in having such provisions in the Collective Agreement. It was so clear that we didn’t even bring a similar proposal to the table in this round.
The second recommendation of the Status of Women’s Committee was to modify Part 4, Article 4.03 to ensure that, when assessing scholarship for career decisions, recognition is given to different and diverse experiences of marginalized groups and to affirm that diverse substantive contributions to knowledge must be welcomed in the university. The University had no interest in that proposal either in 2012, but we felt strongly about this proposal. We brought it back to the table (UBCFA proposal #23) in this round and we were able to achieve agreement to make the necessary modifications to the Collective Agreement. We think this will make a significant improvement to how members who engage in non-traditional research will be evaluated.Next up on the blog: Transparency and the University
Procedures for Appointment, Reappointment, Tenure and Promotion
Posted on Thursday, February 12, 2015 at 10:00 am
categories: appointment, reappointment, tenure, promotion, appeal
On Friday, January 30, 2015 the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. This is the third in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute.
Article 5 in Part 4 of the Collective Agreement, concerning procedures for appointment, reappointment, tenure and promotion, requires that all departmental recommendations are to be made by standing committees of eligible members. However the members eligible to serve on these standing committees, and the procedures used, depend on which type of recommendation is being made. In particular, in the case of initial appointments the committee comprises those of a rank “equal to or higher than the rank at which the appointment is to be made” (Article 5.04(b)(i)). This seemed unnecessarily complicated to us and we heard from members that many departments were informally consulting all tenure-stream members on initial appointments. We proposed (UBCFA proposal # 17) to amend the Collective Agreement to ensure all tenure stream faculty are consulted in initial appointments. The parties have agreed to amend Article 5.04(b)(i) so that in the case of initial appointments the committee will now comprise all tenured and tenure-track members of the department. This reflects our view that initial appointments should be collegially determined.
Article 9 in the Collective Agreement concerns periodic review for promotion. Members are entitled to periodic reviews and if they choose can require that their file go through the entire process of departmental recommendation, decanal recommendation, SAC recommendation, Presidential decision and, if necessary, appeal of the decision. A negative recommendation at any stage cannot prevent the file from going through to the President. On the other hand a non-periodic review may be stopped by the Head (9.01(d)) or the Dean (5.11(a)). We had two issues. First, the agreement says that a review that proceeds past the stage of the Head requesting external letters of reference shall be deemed to be a periodic review for the purposes of timing the next review (9.01(g)). That seemed unfair to us. We believed that if the Head or the Dean stops the review, either before or after requesting external references, it should not affect the timing of the next periodic review, since a review of the candidate was not, in any meaningful way, carried out. Second, Article 13.01 can be read to mean that if a non-periodic review goes all the way to the President, and he or she makes a negative decision, the member cannot appeal. This too seemed unfair to us. Our proposal #19 addressed both these issues. UBC has agreed to changes so that if a no periodic review is stopped by the Head or the Dean it will not be considered a periodic review for the purposes of timing and that if it goes all the way to the President and he or she makes a negative decision, the decision can be appealed.
Finally, we have an issue with the so-called “terminal year”. Following a decision not to grant a tenured appointment on the expiry of the tenure clock the member is given a one year terminal appointment (2.03(g)). This affords the member the time to wind down their labs and deal with their graduate students if necessary, and to search for employment elsewhere. It also provides time for the Association to grieve the decision. Very occasionally the grievance is still unresolved at the end of the terminal year and it had been the practice in the past to extend the terminal year until the grievance was resolved. In 2012 the University informed us that they no longer intended to extend the terminal year in these circumstances.
The problem with the University suggesting this approach is that winning an appeal against a tenure denial is cold comfort to someone who has had to leave the university and relocate. The Association proposed to amend the Agreement so that when a member is denied tenure, and the grievance is not resolved within the terminal year, the member’s appointment is extended (UBCFA proposal #20). The university would not agree to amend the Collective Agreement in this way, but they did agree that, for the term of the renewal Collective Agreement, where the President’s decision not to grant tenure is grieved, and the grievance process extends beyond the terminal year, the member’s appointment will be extended at least until the end of the academic term in which the settlement occurs, or the arbitration decision is rendered, if dates for the arbitration have been confirmed by the selected arbitrator prior to the end of the terminal year and UBCFA is moving the grievance efficiently towards resolution. This is not ideal, but we accepted it and dropped our proposal to incorporate such language in the Collective Agreement.Next up on the blog: Equity
Maternity, Parental or Adoptive Leave and Tenure Clock Extension
Posted on Tuesday, February 10, 2015 at 10:00 am
categories: maternity leave, parental leave, tenure clock extensions
On Friday, January 30, 2015 the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. This is the second in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute.
Currently, under Part 3, Article 1.03 of the Collective Agreement, when a pre-tenured member takes a maternity, parental or adoptive leave their pre-tenure appointment is extended by one year (thus extending the “tenure clock”). In the 2012-2014 bargaining round UBC made a proposal that if the leaves were less than 15 weeks in length there would be no extension of the tenure clock, but if they took a leave of 15 or more weeks there would be a one year extension. That proposal made no sense to us then, and we did not accept it. In this round the University made exactly the same proposal (UBC proposal #7). Again it made no sense to us but this time the University’s bargaining team did a better job of explaining their problem and we were able to identify for them why the specific proposal that they made was problematic for us.
The problem, in a nutshell, is that in our Collective Agreement parental and maternity leaves (Part 3 Article 6) are tied to members applying for, and receiving, Employment Insurance (EI) maternity or parental leave payments. The length of leaves members were taking is thus heavily influenced by the EI eligibility rules. In particular while both parents may apply for EI parental benefits, they have to share them. In total, there are 35 weeks of parental benefits available to eligible parents of a newborn or newly adopted child and the parents decide how to split those benefits up. For example if the biological mother wants to take 25 weeks of parental leave, the other spouse can only take the remaining 10 weeks of benefits. Consequently the length of parental leave taken by a member is heavily determined by household decisions about how to split up the EI benefits. Those decisions are heavily determined by the employment status of the spouse and his or her employer’s provisions for parental leave. The existing provision was highly restrictive in the first place (as a member must apply for some EI to be eligible for the tenure clock extension) and the University’s original proposal would have made things worse. Realistically, the tenure clock extension should be tied to the arrival of a child in the household, not to taking EI benefits.
As a result of our discussions on this matter the Parties agreed to a provision that when an untenured faculty member on a pre-tenure appointment becomes a parent by birth or adoption he or she will be granted an automatic extension of the tenure clock for one year upon request. There’s a little more to it, but that’s the gist. There is no longer a requirement to claim EI to receive the extension.
Next up on the blog: Procedures for Appointment, Reappointment, Tenure and Promotion
Educational Leadership Stream
Posted on Thursday, February 5, 2015 at 2:30 pm
categories: educational leadership stream, professors of teaching, instructors, promotion and tenure
On Friday, January 30, 2015 the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. This is the first in a series of blog posts to discuss both the matters that have been agreed and those that are still in dispute.
In the round of negotiations leading to the 2010-2012 Collective Agreement the University made a proposal to transform the Instructor classification into a full three-rank Educational Leadership classification. At the time the instructor classification had no ranks (Senior Instructor was simply the name given to post-probationary instructors, no actual promotion procedures were involved), the classification was regarded (and described in the Agreement) as a “teaching stream,” and several articles in the Collective Agreement implied that Senior Instructors were analogous to a rank below Assistant Professors. The University proposed to change all of that during that round. The Association’s bargaining team was ambivalent about this proposal (to put it mildly). On the one hand, we knew our members in that stream wanted an improved career path. On the other hand, we feared that members in the newly transformed Educational Leadership stream would be treated as low-cost tenured teaching machines in some Faculties, and as educational leaders in others, leading to a two-tier classification. In the end, based on assurances from the University’s bargaining team that members in the Educational Leadership stream would not be “teaching machines” and that members in every rank in the stream would be afforded adequate time to pursue the educational leadership duties necessary for promotion, we agreed to the University’s proposal. It was, in fact, the very last proposal agreed to in that round of bargaining.
Not surprisingly, problems in the transition from the old model of the instructor stream to the new model have subsequently emerged. In this round the Association took two problems to the table. First, because of the way the Collective Agreement was worded, members in the Educational Leadership classification were not eligible for their first sabbatical after the same length of service that other bargaining unit members were. The Association had assumed this inequity was simply an oversight, left over from the old instructor model and in 2012 we had raised this issue as a housekeeping item. We were told in no uncertain term that this was not housekeeping, that the university fully intended to discriminate against members of the Educational Leadership classification in this way. Not surprisingly, the University did not agree to our proposal at that time. In this round we again made that proposal (UBCFA proposal # 12) and in this round the university took a different approach and we were able to agree to changes to the Collective Agreement to remedy this inequity.
The second change the Association sought (UBCFA proposal # 13) was to define educational leadership in the Collective Agreement in the same way that teaching, scholarly activity, and service are defined in the Collective Agreement. The University saw the value of this, and the parties were able to work together to create an appropriate clause in the agreement that defines these duties. In doing so we were aided by the fact that the Senior Appointments Committee had already tackled this problem and we were able to use their document as a starting point for our discussions.
Finally, the University made a proposal (UBC proposal #6b) to redefine "eligible faculty member" for the purposes of determining which rank votes on appointment, reappointment, tenure and promotion decisions. They pointed out that the current language makes much use of phrases like “of equal or higher rank”, and while the order of the ranks is clear within each stream, there is no real meaning to the notion of “equal rank” across streams. With the new Educational Leadership model the three ranks within each of the educational leadership and professorial streams have become untethered from each other, with ranks in one stream neither being above, below, nor equal to ranks in the other stream in any sense.
This leaves a practical problem. Who is eligible to serve on which tenure and promotion committee? The obvious answer is that if the committee is to consider, for example, the promotion of an Instructor to Senior Instructor only Senior Instructors and Professors of Teaching should be eligible, and that if the committee is to consider the promotion of an Assistant Professor to Associate Professor only Associate Professors and Professors should be eligible. Similarly, only Professors of Teaching should be eligible for committees considering promotion to Professor of Teaching and only Professors should be eligible for committees considering promotion to Professor. There are a couple of problems with this solution. First, in many departments there are relatively few members of the Educational Leadership stream, which would mean tenure and promotion committees would be largely comprised of Educational Leadership faculty from other departments in order to achieve the minimum committee size. But more fundamentally, we did not get the sense from our face-to-face meetings with members that this was a solution that would meet wide approval.
Consequently, we decided to punt. We told the University’s bargaining committee that the Association did not have a position on this, and we were not ready to deal with it the Collective Agreement. Instead we agreed on a set of voting rules, which will be in place during the life of this Agreement. The rules are not exactly arbitrary but they don’t imply any discernable relationship between ranks in the two streams. For example, we agreed that Senior Instructors will now vote on reappointment of Assistant Professors, but not on Promotion to Associate Professor. Associate Professors will vote on promotion to Senior Instructor, but not to promotion to Professor of Teaching. Professors of Teaching and Professors will vote on promotion to Professor of Teaching and Professor.On the question of the makeup of the Dean’s Advisory Committees, the problem was less fraught, both on its face and based on our pre-bargaining face-to-face meetings with members. UBC proposed that both Professors and Professors of teaching be eligible to be selected by the Deans or elected by the members to serve on the Dean’s Advisory Committee, and we agreed. Obviously this doesn’t imply any relationship between the ranks, only that those are the highest ranks in their respective streams. This seemed a reasonable solution. Indeed, in many universities the equivalent of the Dean’s Advisory Committee contains members from all ranks and for years Associate Professors have been members of the Dean’s Advisory Committee in the Okanagan as a practical solution to the low numbers of Professors in the Okanagan, even though this would be completely unacceptable on the Vancouver campus.
Next up on the blog: Maternity, Parental and Adoptive Leaves
Bargaining Ends with Some Agreements
Posted on Sunday, February 1, 2015 at 9:00am
categories: bargaining, settlement, arbitration
The first phase of bargaining between UBC and UBCFA has ended. During this phase, the parties attempt to reach a final agreement on all matters, in which case the agreement is then put to the members for a ratification vote. However, if this phase ends with some matters unresolved, then “the matters in dispute shall be submitted to arbitration” (Part I, Article 9.04(b) of the Collective Agreement(see page 8). This phase concluded on Friday, January 30, 2015 when the parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement that itemizes the proposals on which agreement has been reached, the proposals the parties have mutually agreed to withdraw, and those "matters still in dispute" that the parties may submit to arbitration. We will be providing more details on the agreements reached in future blog posts.
We have now entered the second phase of the process. Our legal counsel has been instructed to contact the University's legal counsel to finalize the details of the arbitration including, importantly, the dates for the arbitration hearings. We don't expect that the arbitration will take place until the summer, since arbitrators that would be acceptable to both parties are much in demand and already heavily booked. Between now and the beginning of the arbitration hearings the parties can continue to discuss outstanding issues and we fully anticipate we will have further meetings with the university's bargaining team to see if we can settle any of the items in dispute. While it is possible that arbitration could still be avoided, and all outstanding issues resolved, as happened two bargaining rounds ago, this seems unlikely. The parties are far apart on some key issues, including the general wage increase. Again, we will be providing information on the positions of the parties on the unresolved issues in future blog posts.
The bargaining team would like our members to know that this round of bargaining was a much more pleasant and productive experience than the two previous rounds. Both the Association and the University engaged in open, honest dialogue and worked very hard to come to agreement on a number of very important issues. Though we wish more had been resolved, we enter the arbitration phase pleased with what we’ve accomplished, so going to arbitration should not be considered a failure in any way.
Next up on the blog: Educational Leadership Stream
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A Most Peculiar Proposal
Posted on Thursday, June 12, 2014 at 4:22pm
categories: bargaining, salaries
As part of its general wage increase offer the University has made what must be described as a most peculiar proposal. Their proposal is that on May 1, 2016, in addition to the general wage increase they have proposed, our salaries will also be increased by 50% of the amount by which the Economic Forecast Council forecast underestimates real (inflation adjusted) GDP growth in 2014. They also proposed similar forecast error increases on May 1, 2017, May 1, 2018, and May 1, 2019. This will take some explaining.
The Budget Transparency and Accountability Act of July 6, 2000 creates an Economic Forecast Council comprising “at least 10 persons appointed by order of the minister and selected for their knowledge of the economy of British Columbia and their expertise in economic analysis and forecasting.” Initially the Council included both academic and business experts, but after the Liberals came to power they quickly eliminated the academic experts, and the council now consists solely of appointees from banks, private consulting firms, business organizations like the Business Council of BC, and independent non-profit research organizations like the Conference Board of Canada.
In approximately February of each year the BC government brings down its annual budget, which includes forecasts of real GDP growth for that year by members of the Council. In the 2014 BC Budget and Fiscal Plan members of the Council forecast real GDP growth for 2014. Their forecasts ranged from 2.0% to 2.7% growth in real GDP, with a mean forecast of 2.33%. In November 2015 (twenty months after the 2014 budget was passed) Statistics Canada will produce its estimates of actual real GDP in 2014 and it will be possible to evaluate the accuracy of the Council’s forecasts. UBC has proposed that if the Council’s forecast error (Actual minus Mean Forecast) is positive, then in May 2016 (six months after the forecast error is known) our salaries would increase by one half of the forecast error. In other words, they propose to tie our salaries to inaccuracies in the Economic Forecast Council’s forecasts twenty-six months earlier. If the Council’s average forecast is exactly correct we would get no additional salary increase, but if the Council wildly underestimates growth we will be in for a big payday.
The University claimed that the purpose of this peculiar proposal is to share “the benefits of economic growth between employees in the public sector and the Province contingent on growth in BC’s real GDP” This is false. Had the University wanted to tie our salaries to BC’s real GDP growth, they should have proposed increases based on actual GDP growth, or on GDP growth in excess of the long-run average growth rate. Rather than tie our salaries to BC’s real GDP growth, they have actually proposed to tie them to the inaccuracy of the Economic Forecast Council’s forecasts. Now, to be fair, as far as we know the University’s proposal was devised by the Government, and the University believes the Government is willing to fund the proposal. In any case it is the UBC Board of Governors who are responsible for proposals made at the bargaining table and, for better or worse, this is the peculiar proposal they have decided to make.
How accurate has the Council been in the past? Starting in 2003, the first year that academic experts were eliminated from the Council, and ending in 2012, the last year for which Statistics Canada estimates are available, the Council’s estimates have been reasonably accurate (whether they would have been more or less accurate with the continued inclusion of academic experts is unknown). During that 10-year period the mean absolute forecast error was 0.85, which is not bad considering how sensitive BC’s GDP is to unexpected developments in international markets and resource prices. What would have been the effect on our salaries during those 10 years had the University’s current proposal been in place during that time? The average annual increase over those ten years would have been fifteen-one hundredths of one percent (.0015), which can be translated as $150 annually (before tax) for a faculty member making $100,000.
There is, however, no accurate way to assess what effect this specific proposal would really have on our incomes in the future. First, we have no way of knowing whether the future members of the Council, which is appointed by the Government, will be as accurate in forecasting GDP growth as the past members of the Council. Second, we have no way of knowing how the Council’s forecasting ability will be affected by finding its forecasts part of the mechanism by which faculty members are paid and universities are funded.
We have not responded to this proposal. There is very little point in discussing what is in effect a lottery with unknown expected payout until the University makes a proposal on a general wage increase that is sufficient to keep pace with inflation and faculty salaries at comparable institutions. Nonetheless it remains a most peculiar proposal.
Next up on the blog: Bargaining Ends with Some Agreements
UBC Proposes 0% for 2014/2015. The Association Declines.
Posted on Monday, June 9, 2014 at 3:25pm
categories: bargaining, salaries
On June 5 the Faculty Association and UBC exchanged proposals for a general wage increase (GWI). The University has proposed a five-year agreement with a GWI of 0% in 2014/15, 0.9% in 2015/2016, 1.4% in 2016/17, 1.4% in 2017/2018, and 1.5% in 2018/19. The Association has proposed a two-year agreement with a GWI of 3% in 2014/15 and 3%.
The University's proposals are actually a little more complicated than that, with some salary increases partly deferred by 10 months, the "option" of taking smaller GWI in exchange for increased benefits, like increased Professional Development funds, and a bonus based on the forecast errors made by the Economic Forecast Council We will explain this forecast error bonus in a subsequent blog, but if this bonus had been in place over the past two years, your base salary would have been increased by .04% [four one-hundredths of a percent].
In the last round of bargaining, UBC had originally proposed a GWI of 0.4% and 0.8% over two years. In this round they have initially proposed an even smaller GWI over two years (with below-inflation increases in three additional years).
The Association's proposal of 3% and 3% is based on the following considerations. First, under our Collective Agreement an arbitrator must take into account the University's need to preserve a reasonable balance between the salary of members of the bargaining unit and other expenditures. Second, we know from the last arbitration that a settlement of more than 5% per year would disrupt a reasonable balance, but a settlement of 5% over two years certainly does not disrupt a reasonable balance. Third, an arbitrator must consider changes in price and wage inflation in BC and Canada. It is clear that both price and wage inflation has been trending up from last year, so on that basis, a settlement greater than last year's settlement is justified. Finally, an arbitrator must consider salaries and benefits at other Canadian universities of comparable academic quality and size.
Since our settlement last round was not very different from the settlement at other large research universities in Canada, there is no reason to believe that there has been any change in the relationship between our salaries and those at other Canadian universities of comparable academic quality and size. Taking all these considerations into account, a settlement somewhat greater than last year's settlement is justified.
Next up on the blog: A Most Peculiar Proposal
Our Pension Proposals
Posted on Thursday, May 22, 2014 at 10:09am
categories: bargaining, pension, sessionals, post-71 members
Two of our proposals pertain to pensions. First, we propose that the university provide pension plan contribution for all sessional lecturers. Currently the university only pays full compensation (salary plus pension plan contributions) to sessional lecturers with at least 50% workloads. Second, we propose to work out a way for members' full compensation not to be reduced at age 71, which would happen if the university stopped paying the pension plan contributions at that age.
To understand why we feel so strongly about these proposals it is first necessary to understand how our pension plan works.
At UBC faculty do not have a standard pension. What we call a pension, and what is certainly a pension substitute, is actually a defined contribution savings plan, which is really more akin to a locked-in group RRSP plan. Each year the employer puts a certain percentage of our compensation into the savings plan, and we save a certain percentage of our salary in the same plan. The contributions to the plan are tax deferred, as is any income earned in the plan, just like any other registered savings plan. Unlike a traditional pension, which is both a deferred compensation and an insurance instrument, our plan is a forced savings and investment instrument.
In terms of the University's financial obligations it makes no difference whether they put some portion of our compensation into our group savings plan, or pay the equivalent amount to us directly, allowing us to put it into our personal RRSPs. And it makes no difference to the university at all how much we contribute to our group savings plan (currently about 5%). Whether we save 5%, 10%, or nothing at all in the plan in addition to the amount the university puts in directly is completely irrelevant to the university, at least in terms of cost.
This is not to take a position on the question of whether members would be better or worse off if all their compensation was paid directly them, rather than having some of their compensation placed directly into a locked-in savings plan. Nor is it to take a position on the question of whether a traditional pension, like the one at U of T, is better than our plan. There is certainly room for debate on those issues but since we have not proposed any changes in our plan, that debate is moot.
The point we want to make is simply this: the university's contribution to the plan is simply part of our total compensation, and our so-called pension is simply savings. Once that is understood, it is easy to see why this issue is so important to us.
Consider Sessional Lecturer A in the Faculty of Arts, who teaches one 3-credit course in each Winter session term and has been placed at step 1 of the minimum scale. Dr. A earns a salary of $6,264 for each of the two courses, or a total of $12,528. Sessional Lecturer B, similarly placed at step 1 of the minimum scale, who teaches two 3-credit courses in one term and no courses in the other term will also receive $12,528 in salary, but unlike Sessional Lecturer A, will receive $1,090 placed into his or her defined contribution savings plan. This is not just inequitable, but arbitrary. (Sessional Instructor C, who teaches the same two courses in the Faculty of Education would be paid only $3,756 per course but that gross inequity is the subject of a different proposal.)
Now consider the case of a full-time member who earns $100,000 a year in base salary. His or her total compensation is $100,000 plus the university's contribution to the group savings plan, $9,118. Once this member turns 71 the university is no longer allowed, by law, to contribute to either a defined benefit pension plan, or a registered savings plan. If we don't find a way to ensure that the member continues to receive that $9,118 in compensation he or she will have suffered a cut in total compensation, which is not only inequitable, but a blatant example of discrimination on the basis of age. The law does not require that individuals receive less compensation at the age of 71, only that the compensation can no longer be provided through a pension plan or a registered savings plan contribution. The Association has proposed that full compensation be maintained through the simple mechanism of salary in lieu of contribution to the plan. The fact that this hypothetical member will simultaneously be earning salary in lieu of group plan contributions at the same time he or she is drawing on his or her plan savings is completely irrelevant in the same way that drawing on one's private RRSP savings should not be taken as a reason for the University to cut one's compensation.
Next up on the blog: UBC Proposes 0% for 2014/2015. The Association Declines.
An External Analysis of the University's Budget Model
Posted on Wednesday, May 21, 2014 at 9:56am
categories: bargaining, budget, ability to pay
In preparing for the 2012-2014 arbitration, the Faculty Association commissioned a report from Professors Cameron Morrill and Janet Morrill, accounting professors in the Asper School of Business at the University of Manitoba. The Morrills have considerable experience in examining University budgets for Faculty Associations in Canada. While we did not use this report in the actual arbitration, it did help us to understand a variety of issues related to the University’s ability to pay appropriate salaries to faculty members.
Some of the highlights of their report include the following observations:
- UBC has continuously had unrestricted operating surpluses i.e., operating revenues that exceed operating expenses. In the most recent fiscal year [for which data were available, 2012], UBC had the highest operating surplus of the five years covered by our analysis. The $135 million operating surplus in 2011-2012 was equivalent to just over 13% of total UBC salaries for the year. It would be interesting to see how this figure compares to total UBC faculty salaries.
- Despite small reductions in government grants, UBC has a large student base and unrestricted revenues per student that are stable and have increased over the period of our analysis.
- Net assets: unrestricted and operating became negative in 2012 after a 90-million-dollar decrease during the year, but this situation was created by the Administration’s decision to transfer $229 million in unrestricted funds to Capital Assets.
- The recent level of capital asset acquisitions is extremely high and is financed with an unusually high proportion of unrestricted funds. Management’s future commitments to purchase capital assets are minimal. Thus, they can elect to not make as large capital assets purchases from operating funds, or can be forced to make such an election.
- Over the period under study, management has expended large sums to increase their complement of management and professional staff. While we only know the number of staff, our experience from other universities is that these staff are very highly paid and have often had salary increases that far outpace the increases provided to professorial faculty.
- As with many universities, UBC’s budgeted figures for the future tend to be pessimistic and should therefore not be relied upon as a basis for assessing ability to pay.
We encourage you to read the Morrills’ report carefully.
Next up on the blog: Our Pension Proposals
The University's Destructive Budget Model
Posted on Thursday, May 08, 2014 at10:34am
categories: bargaining, budget, ability to pay
By far and away the largest single complaint we received from members while we prepared for bargaining concerned UBC's budget model. Members are justifiably unhappy about a budget model in which the departments and Faculties are not treated as central to the core mission of the University. The comment “I am particularly concerned about the apparent over-allocation of University funds to administrative positions/costs, and a concomitant reduction of funds available to support scholarly activity and investment in hiring faculty” sums up the comments of many, many members. Repeatedly members asked us to attempt to force the University to fund departments properly. Several members pointed out something that, quite frankly had not occurred to us. They noted that because the costs of the equity settlement were downloaded onto departments, those departments that were predominantly women were most badly affected. Clever, that. The University admits it has been systematically discriminating against women faculty but its response has been most damaging to female-dominated departments by not directly funding the equity settlement. We have also heard repeated complaints that the University did not fund the salary settlement for faculty. The Central Administration does not seem to plan its budget around salary settlements, which many faculty members find troubling.
Although this issue does not fit easily into Collective Agreement language, and we have not attempted to do so in this round, the Association is extremely concerned with the destructive effects of the University's budget model. At this stage we strongly urge members, and particularly Heads, not to accept this budget model as appropriate and to push back on the Deans. We also encourage the Deans to push back against central administration. The current approach to budgeting is so wrongheaded and so destructive that it threatens the very integrity of the institution. It is starving those areas of the University that are its fundamental raison d'etre. While the property development side and the other non-academic sides of the University are undoubtedly important, at the end of the day it is the teaching and scholarly activity side that must remain the core business of the University and the budget model must reflect that.
Next up on the blog: An External Analysis of the University's Budget Model
Bargaining Themes: Three Big Issues Emerge
Posted on Tuesday, May 06, 2014 at 12:20pm
categories: bargaining, workload, instructors
When the bargaining preparation committee analysed the input we got from members in face-to-face meetings, from emails, and from the survey, particularly the comments sections of the survey, three major issues emerged, in addition to widespread concern about salaries. Members can see that most of our non-salary proposals deal with these issues in one way or another.
First, we are increasingly observing what can only be described as symptoms of burnout. Members complain of too much to do, with too little time, and too few resources. They report a sense that they have lost the capacity to influence the decisions that affect the quality of their worklife. They report significant concerns about the equity of the reward structure and a sense that the university does not value their contributions. Amongst many members there is a sense that the university's priorities no longer reflect the values that attracted them to academic careers in the first place. These complaints are classic, almost textbook, symptoms of burnout.
Terms like “bullying,” “no consultation,” “unfair,” “inequitable”, and “minimal information” appear repeatedly in the comments. Examples of such comments include:
- “Faculty are more and more burdened with the downloading of administrative duties and not getting much credit for taking it on.”
- “Management treatment of faculty is horrendous.”
- “Toxic work environment.”
- “ More comprehensive language around transparency.”
- “Can the deteriorating work environment be addressed in any way by bargaining?”
- “I believe the largest generation of long-term problems for faculty at UBC is the increasingly disconnected nature of the decision-making progress of upper levels (finance, initiatives like the Vantage program, IT, etc) from the faculty. Decisions are constantly being made with either no consultation with the faculty/staff members who these decisions will impact, or a sham of consultation.”
Second, there is significant dissatisfaction with the status of contract academic staff. Over 25% of our members are contract academics, mostly Sessionals but increasingly Lecturers as well. Salaries, job security, access to benefits, and pension contributions are all inadequate. Comments from Sessionals and Lecturers were scathing of course, but many members in tenure-stream positions also made a point of conveying their dismay about the conditions of contract faculty.
Third, there is a great deal of dissatisfaction among members in the educational leadership stream (Instructor I, Senior Instructor, Professor of Teaching) about the lack of respect the university shows them. Many expressed concerns that their heavy teaching loads would not allow them to complete the educational leadership requirements that are now required for tenure and promotion in that stream. These problems arise from lack of clarity in the Collective Agreement about the role of the educational leadership stream at the University.
We really appreciate the time people took to share their comments with us as we prepared for bargaining. It was very helpful to us in formulating our proposals.
Next up on the blog:The University's Destructive Budget Model
Bargaining Begins for 2014-2016
Posted on Monday, April 4, 2014 at 3:20pm
categories: bargaining, proposals
Negotiations between UBC and UBCFA to renew the Collective Agreement that expires on June 30, 2014 began formally on April 7 - 8, although the parties did engage in some preliminary discussions in the preceding months.
Both parties have presented all of their proposals, with two exceptions. UBC has a proposal on the library they have yet to make and we are still finalizing our list of housekeeping items.
The University has not tabled any specific language and the Association has thus far only tabled specific language on a few issues. At our next meeting, on May 8, it is expected that both parties will table specific language on all proposals with the possible exception of across the board salary increases. The Association will not table a specific proposal on across the board salary increases until the University's bargaining team has been authorized to make a meaningful response.
Until specific language has been tabled, it's not reasonable to attempt to characterize the University's proposals; however, members can read the proposals that the University has tabled thus far here. The Association’s proposals can be found here. Over the next month we will be using this blog to give members more detailed description of the problems we are trying to solve and the objectives we are attempting to achieve, so stay tuned.
Next up on the blog: Bargaining Themes: Three Big Issues Emerge
Bargaining: Preparation for Next Round Begins
Posted on wednesday, january 22, 2014 at 3:15pm
categories: bargaining, arbitration
Although the 2012-2014 Collective Agreement was only finalized in late 2013, it will soon expire, on June 30, 2014. Consequently it is already time to begin preparations for the next round of negotiations, tentatively set to begin in mid-March. Once negotiations begin it is expected that they will proceed fairly intensively until either a new Collective Agreement, or impasse, is reached. Our expectation is that if the University is willing and able to negotiate a Collective Agreement without recourse to an Arbitrator, it will be done by mid-June.
As always, if a new agreement is not reached before the expiration of the current agreement the current agreement will remain in force.
Members will well recall that the last round of negotiations, which started on February 14, 2012, was a very long drawn-out process. This was partly caused by the university’s unwillingness or inability to “put money on the table” until well after the previous agreement had expired and an arbitrator named, and partly caused when the arbitrator contracted an illness at precisely the time he was scheduled to hear our arbitration. We hope that this round can be concluded more expeditiously, preferably without the help of an arbitrator, but to some extent this is outside our control.
Members can expect to receive an invitation to complete a fairly short electronic bargaining survey soon. In addition to the usual set of questions there is space for members to relate any specific concerns or issues they would like to see addressed in this round of negotiations. We would greatly appreciate it if you would take the time to complete it.
If you’d like to be considered for our bargaining preparation committee or our bargaining advisory committee, please send an email to us. We are looking for members who would like to be involved in various aspects of the bargaining process, and would like to make that commitment to the Association.
To avoid email overload, we selectively email blogs to the entire message. Be sure to check back to the blog on a regular interval by bookmarking this webpage. Or, you can subscribe to our blog to get automatic updates.
Next up on the blog: Bargaining Begins for 2014-2016
What the Arbitrator Ruled in Bargaining 2012, and Why
Posted on Monday, November 18, 2013 at 8:45am
categories: Interest arbitration, bargaining, salary increases
On July 25, 2013, the Faculty Association and the University sent out a joint memorandum describing the details of the arbitration award for the years 2012 – 2014. We also linked to the actual award so that members could read it in its entirety. However many members have found the entire award a bit much to internalize and have asked us for a short, non-technical, explanation of the reasoning behind the salary settlement. Here it is.
The first thing Arbitrator Taylor had to adjudicate was the question of how large a salary award the University had the ability to pay, based on maintaining a “reasonable balance” between faculty salaries and other expenditures in the University’s general purpose operating funds. He found that the ratio of faculty salaries to total expenditures, over the seven years between 2006 and 2012, ranged from a low of 24.9% to a high of 28.8%.
The Association took the position that a pay rise of 5% per year would still maintain a reasonable balance and the University took the position that 2% per year was the absolute maximum increase that would maintain a reasonable balance. Arbitrator Taylor accepted neither position. He ruled that the Association’s proposal of general wage increases of 5% and 5% would result in ratios for 2013 and 2014 (forecast) of 28.9% and 31.1%, respectively. In his view, for 2014, the Association’s proposal was outside the reasonable balance and therefore beyond the University’s ability to pay. On the other hand he also ruled that the University did have the ability to pay a salary increase in excess of 2% per year.
The second question on which Arbitrator Taylor had to rule was, within the fairly wide range of salary increases that the University did have the ability to pay, what salary award was most appropriate? In making that decision he primarily considered the need to keep pace with inflation and the general state of salaries at our comparator universities.
The Association had argued that higher wages were also needed for the purpose of recruitment and retention. However on that point Arbitrator Taylor said “I accept the University’s submissions that it does not have a general recruitment and retention problem.”
The University had argued that our progress through the ranks (CPI, Merit and PSA) and annual bonus represented something analogous to an annual pay increase. On this point Arbitrator Taylor said: “I also accept the Association’s submission that PTR rewards individuals’ career advancement; it is not a substitute for a general wage increase to keep pace with inflation and the general state of salaries elsewhere.”
In terms of the criteria on which his award was primarily based, inflation and the general state of salaries elsewhere, he ruled that a) monthly price inflation was fairly low, ranging from 1.25% to 2.33% between January 2011 and July 2012; b) monthly wage inflation was somewhat higher, ranging from 1.8% to 3.2% over the same period; and c) salaries at UBC have fallen somewhat behind its relative place in terms of academic quality. Taking these factors into account he ruled:
“The appropriate Award under Article 11.02 [of the Collective Agreement] is therefore annual increases of 2.5% and 2.5%.” and “I am satisfied this falls within the University’s ‘ability to pay’ as defined in that Article.”
The Association was not unhappy with this award even though we would have preferred a larger increase. While a higher awarded increase would still have remained within the University’s ability to pay it was not the Arbitrator's duty to award the largest possible increase that the University can afford, but to make an award that is appropriate given criteria such as inflation and wages at comparable universities. We think he discharged his duties thoughtfully and impartially.
Next up on the blog: Bargaining: Preparation for Next Round Begins